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I. INTRODUCTION
As conventional sources of oil and gas become less productive and
energy prices rise, production companies are developing creative
extraction methods to tap sources like oil shales and tar sands that
were previously not worth drilling. Companies are also using new
technologies to wring more oil or gas from existing conventional
wells. This article argues that as the hunt for these resources ramps
up, more extraction is occurring closer to human populations - in
north Texas' Barnett Shale and the Marcellus Shale in New York
and Pennsylvania. And much of this extraction is occurring through
a well-established and increasingly popular method of wringing re-
sources from stubborn underground formations called hydraulic frac-
turing, which is alternately described as hydrofracturing or "fracing,"
wherein fluids are pumped at high pressure underground to force out
oil or natural gas.
Coastal Oil and Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,1 a recent Texas
case addressing disputes over fracing in Hidalgo County, Texas, ex-
emplifies the human conflicts that are likely to accompany such
creative extraction efforts. One conflict is trespass: whether extend-
ing fractures onto adjacent property and sending fluids and agents
into the fractures to keep them open constitutes a common law tres-
pass. Few state courts have addressed this issue directly, and Texas'
conclusion in Coastal Oil that damages from the drainage of natural
gas from adjacent property through fracing do not constitute an ac-
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1. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I (Tex.
2008).
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tionable trespass claim is likely to have national implications, as
other jurisdictions may follow the lead of a court highly familiar
with oil and gas law. Companies in Pennsylvania and southern New
York are already citing Coastal Oil as a defense when property own-
ers argue that loud seismic trucks are trespassing on private prop-
erty.2 But trespass is only one piece of a larger puzzle. In 2005,
Congress exempted fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act,
bringing to an end a long legal and political debate over whether the
federal government should regulate fracing under its water laws.
3
Without federal statutes or common law liabilities like trespass gov-
erning fracing, the regulation of fracing is left wholly to state gov-
ernments. And some decline to regulate. In Texas, for example,
"neither the Legislature nor the [Railroad] Commission has ever
seen fit" to regulate hydrofracturing, in the words of the supreme
court.4 Although some states like Pennsylvania and New York have
relatively comprehensive regulations that cover fracing, other states
lack regulations that specifically address the practice. The absence
of regulation is not of great concern if fracing is a relatively benign
practice that can be sufficiently controlled through the general per-
mitting process; but if fracing has significant environmental and
public health impacts, the lack of regulation is problematic. This
article investigates fracing through an environmental lens and con-
cludes that given the potential consequences of this increasingly
common practice, more regulatory control over fracing may be
needed, and, at minimum, regulators should re-visit existing controls
in light of an up-to-date scientific investigation of fracing and deter-
mine whether these controls are adequate.
The article begins by providing a brief introduction, in Part II, to
the practice of fracing and then describes its geographic expansion as
2. See, e.g., Tom Wilber, Landowners Cry Foul over Seismic Searches,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Sept. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
3. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § l(a), 119 Stat. 594
(2005). Paragraph (1) of section 1421(d) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42
U.S.C. 300h(d)) is amended to read as follows:
(1) UNDERGROUND INJECTION - The term 'underground injection' -
(A) means the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection; and
(3) excludes - (i) the underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage;
and (ii) the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel
fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal
production activities.
4. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 17.
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a result of the search for unconventional sources of oil and gas. Part
III discusses the potential environmental effects of fracing. Part IV
describes the current laws and regulations that apply to fracing, in-
cluding the low level of federal and court oversight and varying de-
grees of regulation by state agencies. Finally, Part V analyzes the
implications of this legal and regulatory framework, suggesting that
the EPA's conclusion that fracing did not merit further research and
Congress' exemption of fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act
involved two types of regulatory failure. Part V also suggests
needed reforms, arguing that given the potential, but under-
researched, environmental impacts of fracing, a comprehensive na-
tional survey that is scientifically rigorous should identify the envi-
ronmental effects of fracing in all regions of the United States. Stud-
ies take time, however, and there may be substantial risks associated
with fracing with toxic fluids in underground sources that are in or
potentially connected to underground sources of drinking water. As
such, while the study is taking place, Congress should begin to re-
consider its decision to exempt fracing from the Safe Drinking Water
Act. States should also determine whether their current oil and gas
regulation - the general regulation of oil and gas production or spe-
cific control of fracing - adequately identifies and accounts for the
effects of fracing on human health and the environment.
II. FRACING: THE PRACTICE AND ITS PREVALENCE
A. An Introduction to the Technical Aspects of Fracing
Several types of subterranean formations in the United States have
valuable oil or gas that is difficult to extract. Some coalbeds, for
example, contain "high concentrations" of methane,5 although the
5. Jeffrey R. Levine, Coalification: The Evolution of Coal as Source Rock
and Reservoir Rock for Oil and Gas, in AAPG Studies in Geology #38: Hydro-
carbons from Coal 39, 39-77 (Ben E. Law & Dudley D. Rice, eds., 1995); see also
id. at 40-41 (discussing how, assuming methane were a free gas within coal, meth-
ane would make up 100 percent of the volume within the coal's interstitial areas
that hold small molecules); S.A. Holditch & J.W. Ely, et al., Enhanced Recovery
of Coalbed Methane Through Hydraulic Fracturing, Society of Petroleum Engi-
neers 18250, 1 (1988) ("Coalbed methane production is viewed as a... significant
energy source."); I.D. Palmer & M.W. Davids et al., Analysis of Unconventional
Behavior Observed during Coalbed Fracturing Treatments, 1989 PROC. COALBED
METHANE SYMP. 395-411.
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value of coalbed methane depends on its concentration and "the rate
at which ... [the gas is] able to flow from the coal matrix to a pro-
duction well." 6 The same is true for shales which, like coalbeds,
may contain large quantities of "trapped" natural gas or oil. One
way to increase the flow rate and the productivity of the gas or oil in
shale or a coalbed is to create fractures in the formation, providing
space through which the gas or oil can flow. To frac a formation,
engineers inject a fluid into the well bore at high pressures to induce
fractures or expand existing natural fractures and to carry "prop-
pants" into those fractures. Proppants "are sand or other granular
substances injected into the formation to hold or 'prop' open . . .
fractures created by hydraulic fracturing.",7  The ultimate goal of
many fracing operations is to ensure that the fractures connect the
wellbore to the area of the shale or coalbed in which production has
been stimulated,8 allowing the gas or oil to flow into the well.
There are several methods of fracing, although all require some
sort of fluid. The fluids used in the process vary from pure water to
water mixed with solvents or gel (a drilling mud or a polymer, for
example9) to hydrochloric acid' ° and even diesel fuel,'1 although
6. Levine, supra note 5, at 71.
7. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources
of Drinking Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs, EPA
816R04003 at 4-1 (June 2004) available at http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/
pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch04_hyd fracfluids.pdf (hereinafter EPA 2004).
8. Id.; see also id. at App. A-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/
uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic append_a-doewhitepaper.pdf (discussing the
purposes of hydraulic fracturing, including increasing flow rate of low permeabil-
ity reservoirs or damaged wells and connecting the "natural fractures and/or cleats
in a formation to the wellbore"); Ian Bryant, Hello, Frac, OIL AND GAS INVESTOR
(March 2007), available at http://www.slb.com/media/services/stimula-
tion/fracturing/ori_2007031.pdf ("In unconventional reservoirs, the biggest chal-
lenge is establishing conduits from the far reaches of the reservoir to the well-
bore.").
9. See Interview with Steve Sasaki, Chief Field Inspector, Montana Board of
Oil and Gas Conservation (Sept. 4, 2008) (notes on file with the author) (discuss-
ing the water sand fracs used in Montana's Bakken shale formation, which typi-
cally use gel consisting of drilling mud or a polymer).
10. See, e.g., BJ-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822, 823 (Utah
1992) ("Hydraulic fracturing extends the bore laterally by injecting fluids into the
well. Acidizing is an extension of hydraulic fracturing and uses hydrochloric acid
in combination with other agents to improve well flow capacity.").




many operators have signed a non-enforceable 12 memorandum of
agreement not to use diesel fuel. 13 Fracing fluids must have proper-
ties that allow them to stimulate fractures and to send proppants into
the fractures.14  The fluids also help to pull back the excess prop-pants once the fractures have been stimulated. 15 From the produc-
tion perspective, the ideal fracturing fluids are not too expensive, do
not require too much added water, flow well and have low friction,
induce "wide fractures," suspend the proppants in solution and move
them in "high concentrations," 16 and "break back to a low viscosity
fluid for clean up after treatment."' 7 For some fracing, specialized
fluids are used - often to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of
the process, whether by decreasing the amount of fluid that must be
injected or by more thoroughly removing the excess proppants that
do not remain in the fracture.' "Foamed" or "energized" fluids, for
example, which have added carbon dioxide or nitrogen, reduce the
quantity of water required and thus the wastewater produced by frac-
ing 19mg.'
12. See Letter from Weston Wilson, EPA Employee, to Wayne Allard, Ben
Nighthorse Campbell and Diana DeGette (Oct. 8, 2004) at 5, available at
http://latimes.image2.trb.com/lanews/media/acrobat/2004-10/14647025.pdf (ex-
plaining that the agreement is "voluntary and non-enforceable" and that the "EPA
has no oversight over these companies to assure that diesel fuel is no longer used
in hydraulic fracturing fluids in coalbed methane reservoirs").
13. A Memorandum of Agreement Between The U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency and
BJ Services Company, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and Schlumberger
Technology Corp., Dec. 12, 2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/
uic/pdfs/moa uichyd-fract.pdf.
14. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 4-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch04hydfrac fluids.pdf.
15. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. John W. Ely & Stephen A. Holditch, Fracturing Techniques Depend on
Coal Seam Characteristics, 88 OIL & GAS J. (Issue 30), July 23, 1990, available at
http://www.ogj .comcurrentissue/index.cfin?p=7&v=88&i=30.
17. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at App. A-12.
18. See, e.g., Bureau of Oil and Gas Management, Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
Oil and Gas Operators Manual, Oil and Gas Management Practices, Document
No. 550-0300-001, Chapter 4 at 7, available at http://164.156.71.80/
WXLogin.aspx?dp=%2fWXOD.aspx%3ffs%3d2087d8407c0e0000800002730000
0273%26ft/o3dl (follow "Login as our guest" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter 4 -
Oil and Gas Management Practices" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (dis-
cussing how foam frac "can reduce the water requirements by more than 75% over
conventional gel or water fracs").
19. Id.
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The type of fracing applied to a formation depends, in part, on the
type of formation and the resource (oil or gas) being extracted, as
well as the "tightness" of the formation, meaning the extent to which
it naturally releases oil or gas when pressure is changed.21 Under the
most basic technique, an operator injects fluids into the well bore to
increase the pressure in the well; at a certain pressure, the formation
surrounding the well begins to crack.22 It is, however, difficult to
predict the length, type, or extent of fractures that will occur using
this technique.23 In Montana's Bakken Shale formation, where all
oil wells are fraced,24 an increasingly common method of fracing
20. See, e.g., Holditch & Ely, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing how "[t]he me-
chanical properties of coal are significantly different from conventional rocks" and
how fracing in coal, unlike in conventional rocks, can "result in the creation of
very wide hydraulic fractures," depending on the specific properties of the coal).
21. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 2
(Tex. 2008) (describing a "tight" shale formation as one that is "relatively impor-
ous and impermeable, from which natural gas cannot be commercially produced
without hydraulic fracturing stimulation").
22. See, e.g., Don G. Briggs, La. Oil and Gas Ass'n, Everyone Benefits from
Haynesville Shale, available at http://www.loga.la/articles/080817.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2009) (discussing the two types of fracing in Haynesville Shale,
which involve using "water and sand under high force to break the rock and re-
lease the gas" and, alternatively, "horizontal drilling techniques"); WILLIAM P.
DIAMOND & DAVID C. OYLER, EFFECTS OF STIMULATION TREATMENTS ON
COALBEDS AND SURROUNDING STRATA 4 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bur. of Mines
1987) (discussing coalbed stimulation using hydraulic fracturing at the Blue Creek
Coalbed in Alabama. At that coalbed a vertical borehole was drilled and cased.
Sand and gelled water were then injected and a "packer" was used at the top of the
wellhead); Bryant, supra note 8 (discussing how "[i]n the past, most hydraulic-
fracture treatments amounted to brute force application of hydraulic pressure to
split the rock," but how recent treatments are more complex).
23. See, e.g., Holditch & Ely, supra note 5, at 1 ("[V]ery complex fracture
systems are usually created during a hydraulic fracturing treatment. Not only are
multiple vertical fractures often created, but fractures propagating in multiple di-
rections can be quite common[.]"); Palmer & Davids et al., supra note 5, at 398-
400 (identifying the factors that explain why fractures, even those created by high
pressure, are sometimes limited to one coal seam and concluding that "other fac-
tors may determine whether a fracture is confined" by an adjacent layer of sand-
stone); Larry Griffin, Pinnacle Technologies, Comparing Fracture Geometry in
the Barnett Shale from Horizontal and Vertical Wellbores, 2003 PROC. FIFTH ANN.
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS & COALBED METHANE CONF. 2-3 (discussing the various
fractures that can occur, such as "T-shaped fractures," "multiple fractures dipping
from vertical," and "twisting fractures" and discussing the limitations of fracture
diagnostic tools).
24. See Interview with Tom Richmond, Administrator, Montana Board of Oil
and Gas Conservation (Sept. 5, 2008) (notes on file with the author).
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allows operators to better control fracture direction and length.
Drillers run a liner through a hole that has been horizontally drilled,
and they fit objects called "swell packers" at intervals within the
liner. Certain injected fluids cause the packers to swell, and the
swelling blocks off portions of the horizontal drill hole. This allows
the operator to isolate the areas where fracing occurs.
2 5
Because fracing is applied to so many different types of formations
using an array of methods and fluids, the environmental effects will
of course differ depending on factors such as the toxicity of the fluid
used; the closeness of the fracture zone to underground drinking wa-
ter; the existence of a barrier between the fractured formation and
other formations; whether or not the fracing service withdraws
groundwater from the area or transports it in; and whether the ser-
vice company recycles wastewater, filters it and disposes of it on the
surface, or sends it to a treatment plant.26 Part II explores several of
these factors in evaluating the range of potential effects.
B. The Expansion of Fracing and Potential Conflicts with Human
Populations
Although engineers are still fine-tuning fracing techniques - from
the type of fluid used27 to the amount of pressure required 28 and the
25. See Interview with Steve Sasaki, supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., Colby Barrett, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round (Drill) Hole:
The Evolving Legal Treatment of Coalbed Methane-Produced Water in the Inter-
mountain West, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIs 10661, 10667 (2008) (de-
scribing the water disposal methods of water produced from general coalbed
methane production processes, explaining that "CBM extractors either discharge
the water on the surface or inject it deep underground," and that for surface dis-
posal "[tlypical disposal methods include placement in lined pits (to allow for
evaporation) unlined pits (to allow the water to seep into shallow aquifers)... air
spraying (which allows for evaporation), or traditional beneficial uses"); see also
James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for Change: Litiga-
tion Efforts Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane Devel-
opment in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE ENVT'L L. REv. 399, 407 (2007) (cit-
ing Gary Bryner, Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law, Coalbed
Methane Development in the Intermountain West 14 (2002), available at
http://www.cbmclearinghouse.info/docs/nrlc/titlecontents-pages.pdf (discussing
how "99.9% of the water [from coalbed methane production] is discharged onto
the surface" in Wyoming's Powder River Basin)).
27. See, e.g., EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 4-1 ("The types and use of fracturing
fluids have evolved greatly over the past 60 years and continue to evolve.").
28. See, e.g., P.E. Nielsen & M.E. Hanson, Analysis and Implications of Three
Fracture Treatments in Coals at the USX Rock Creek Site near Birmingham, Ala-
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methods of predicting the location and size of fractures 29 - fracing
has historically been and will continue to be a profitable method of
extracting non-renewable resources. Fracing was "first used com-
mercially in 1949," and "is now essential to economic production of
oil and gas and commonly used throughout ... the United States,
and the world.",30 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed as
early as 1983:
Commercial exploitation of coalbed gas.., has remained
very limited and sporadic until recently. As a result of
our nation's high energy demands and shortage of energy
supplies.., both the gas industry and the mining industry
have come to regard coalbed gas as having sound market
potential.31
And as the Texas Supreme Court more recently explained, the un-
precedented success of fracing in the Barnett Shale in north central
Texas has "prodded exploration elsewhere," and "'spurr[ed] efforts
to produce gas in many other areas and geological formations that
were previously considered unrecoverable or uneconomic.'
32
Indeed, there is evidence that domestic producers in many regions
of the United States have responded in full force to the demand for
natural gas as technologies for unconventional extraction have im-
proved.33 By the late 1980's, coalbed-produced methane gas was
bama, 1987 Proceedings COALBED METHANE SYMP. 109 (discussing how "high
treatment pressures" that still lead to low gas production may be a result of "de-
formations" in the coalbed and concluding that "[r]ecommended alternative treat-
ment pressures" may be superior in these situations).
29. See, e.g., Palmer & Davids et. al, supra note 5, at 398-400 (discussing the
complicated factors involved in determining whether a fracture will be limited to
one coal seam); Holditch & Ely, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the complexity of
fractures that may occur in a coalbed during fracing).
30. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex.
2008); see also Crocker v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 419 P.2d 265, 271 (Okla.
1965) ("The testimony showed that sandfracing was first discovered in 1948 and
was first used commercially in 1949.").
31. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983).
32. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W. 3d at 32 (quoting TExAs COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTS, THE ENERGY REPORT 2008, at 68 (2008), available at http://www.
window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy).
33. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Drilling Boom Revives Hopes for Natural Gas,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/
business/25gas.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (hereinafter Drilling Boom) (ob-
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"the primary source of natural gas for the state of Alabama" and was
already "rapidly becoming a major source of natural gas in the San
Juan Basin of New Mexico and Colorado." 34 In the Black Warrior
coal basin, no methane wells had been drilled in 1980; by 1987, it
boasted 400 wells. 35 Nationwide, more than six percent of domesti-
cally-produced natural gas came from coal seams in 2000.36 The
EPA identified at least 26 states with coal basins by 2004, 37 with
eleven of those states having major coal basins with the potential to
produce natural gas. 38 At the time of the EPA's report, fracing had
commenced to various degrees in all of the eleven major basins, 39
and hydraulic fracturing was "common" in at least three of these
40basins.
Fracing is not only occurring in coalbeds. As the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Coastal Oil discusses, fracing of shale is increas-
ingly commonplace in areas like North Central Texas, where it is the
only method to extract natural gas from Barnett Shale.41 In 2000,
serving that "American natural gas production is rising at a clip not seen in half a
century, pushing down prices of the fuel and reversing conventional wisdom that
domestic gas fields were in irreversible decline" and that "[d]omestic gas produc-
tion was up 8.8 percent in the first five months" of 2008 compared to the same
period in 2007 - "a rate of increase last seen in 1959").
34. Holditch & Ely, supra note 5, at 1.
35. Palmer & Davids et al., supra note 5, at 395.
36. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at App. A-1.
37. Id. at 1-2 (presenting the EPA's "Locus Map of Major United States Coal
Basins" where large basins extend through a substantial portion of Montana,
Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Texas, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama. The map also shows smaller basins in Wash-
ington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Arizona, and Virginia).
38. Id. at 5-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy
-attach uic ch05_basins.pdf.
39. These basins include the San Juan in Colorado and New Mexico; the Black
Warrior in Alabama and Mississippi; the Piceance in Colorado; the Uinta in Utah
and a small corner of Colorado; the Powder River in Wyoming and Southern Mon-
tana; the Central Appalachian in Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia; the Northern Appalachian in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, and
Maryland, the Western Interior Region in Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Ne-
braska, and Oklahoma, the Raton in Colorado and New Mexico, the Sandwash in
Colorado and Wyoming, and the Pacific Coal Region in Washington and Oregon.
Id. at 5-1 - 5-13.
40. Id. at 5-7, 5-10, 5-11.
41. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex.
2008) (citing Demand for Workers in the Barnett Shale on the Rise, DALLAS Bus.
J. (2006)); Mary Fallin, Hail the Shale, NAT'L REv., July 2, 2008; Clifford Krauss,
2009]
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the Railroad Commission of Texas issued 273 permits for drilling in
the Barnett Shale. In 2004 it issued 1,112 permits, and by 2007 the
42number of permits issued had skyrocketed to 3,653. In Montana,
every oil well in the Bakken Shale formation is fraced, with more
than 600 wells drilled to-date,43 while local newspapers report that
operators in New York's Marcellus Shale may drill and frac more
than 1,500 wells annually. 44 The Marcellus formation as a whole,
which underlies large portions of New York, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, and Ohio, may contain as much as 1.9 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas.45 And on a countrywide basis, one industrial consultant
believes that drillers could produce more than 842 trillion cubic feet
of currently untapped natural gas from shales.46 Fracing service
companies have similarly observed that "[t]he exploitation of shale
reservoirs is the fastest-growing segment" of the land-based natural
gas market.47
Practices like fracing that eke out more profitable resources from
existing mining or drilling sites, or from underground formations
that cannot be tapped with traditional drilling methods, will likely
continue to grow. While international natural gas supplies have
There's Gas in Those Hills, N.Y. TIMEs, APR. 8, 2008, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/business/08gas.html (discussing the boom in
Pennsylvania); see also Krauss, Drilling Boom, supra note 33 (discussing how
"American natural gas production is rising at a clip not seen in half a century" and
how "[m]ost of the gain is coming from shale, particularly the Barnett Shale re-
gion around Fort Worth, which has been under development for several years").
42. Texas Railroad Commission, Newark, East (Barnett Shale), Drilling Per-
mits Issued (1993-2007), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/drill-
ingpermitsissued 1993-2007.pdf.
43. See Interview with Tom Richmond, supra note 24.
44. See Tom Wilber, Water Consumption an Issue in Natural Gas Drilling:
More than 1,500 Wells Expected to be Dug per Year, THE ITHACA JOURNAL (Aug.
13, 2008), available at http://www.theithacajournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arti-
cle?AID=/20080813/NEWSO1/808130326/1002 (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
45. See United States Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscovered Car-
boniferous Coal-Bed Gas Resources of the Appalachian Basin Province, 2002,
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-009-03/FS-009-03-508.pdf (calculated as a
mean).
46. See Krauss, Drilling Boom, supra note 33.
47. Bryant, supra note 8.
48. See, e.g., Nicole Branan, Exploration and Innovation: Geoscientists Push
the Frontiers of Unconventional Oil (Apr. 2008), http://www.jsg.utexas.edu/
news/feats/2008/explorationinnovation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (observ-
ing that "[e]nergy analysts now routinely accept that the world's unconventional
hydrocarbons, such as gas hydrates, tight gas sandstones, and oil and gas shales,
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been forecast to increase in 2009, and domestic supplies skyrocketed
in 2008 - largely due to techniques like fracing 49 - demand for natu-
ral gas in the United States will remain high. 0 Rising energy prices
continue to drive production, 51 and the productivity of natural gas
hold more fuel than undiscovered conventional energy sources" and that "the
world is increasingly turning its attention to unconventional oil and gas"); Oxford
Analytica, Unconventional Oil and Gas No Solution, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE
(Mar. 12, 2007) (discussing how "US unconventional gas reserves are large and
represent a long-term resource" and how "US unconventional gas production is
already on the rise, while conventional gas output is falling"); id, at 6 (discussing
how "[p]roductive capacity in the United States [for natural gas] peaked in 1994,
and it's lower than that today," and how "[t]his time, it appears that the drilling
rig, by itself, will not solve the problem .... We will continue to see a very high
degree of spending and effort by the industry, and that's very important ....").
49. Cassandra Sweet, Natural-Gas Prices May Fall Next Year on Supply
Surge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2008 at section C (observing that Waterborne Energy
forecasts overseas production of liquefied natural gas should rise by about one-
third to 11 trillion cubic feet by end of next year.); see also Krauss, Drilling Boom,
supra note 33 (observing that "domestic natural gas prices have already plunged
42 percent since early July... in part because the rapid [domestic] supply growth
has begun to influence the market" and attributing most of the domestic supply
boom to fracing).
50. See, e.g., Statement of Daniel Yergin, Ph.D., Chairman, Cambridge Energy
Research Associates; Cambridge, Massachusetts, Hearing Before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee Congress of the United States, 10 8th Congress, Second Session
at 5-6 (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 108_senatehearings&docid=f:97866.pdf (discussing how
"[n]atural gas is almost a quarter or our total energy supply in the United States"
and how we "have built in a rising demand" for natural gas, "are on a course of
rising demand," and are "going to see a growing gap between supply and de-
mand." Yergrin also stated that "[o]ver the last few years, this country has added
something like 200,000 megawatts of electric power capacity" and "most all of
that is based upon natural gas"); see also Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Resources of the Committee on Government Reform, Meeting Amer-
ica's Natural Gas Demand. Are we in a Crisis? at 1-2, 109th Congress, 1st Session
(Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_househearings&docid=f:24769.pdf (discussing the
"ongoing tight supply and demand situation [for natural gas] in the United States"
and how "[s]ince the 1900's ... almost every new electric power plant is powered
by natural gas"); Krauss, Drilling Boom, supra note 33 ("While the recent produc-
tion increase is indisputable, not everyone is convinced the additional supplies can
last for decades. 'The jury is still out how big [the] shale is going to be,' said
Robert Ineson, a natural gas analyst at Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a
consulting firm.").
51. See, e.g., Robert Howard, VP ChevronTexaco North American Upstream,
Balancing Natural Gas Policy: Fueling the Demands of a Growing Economy,
2003 PROC. FIFTH ANN. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS & COALBED METHANE CONF.,
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extracted from conventional sources and drilling techniques in the
United States has already peaked.52 The National Petroleum Coun-
cil "estimates that sixty to eighty percent of all wells drilled in the
next decade to meet natural gas demand will require fracturing. 53
All of the recent fracing activity and particularly the fracing frenzy
in Texas' Barnett Shale region, an area covering four "core counties"
(the "most active production zones, 54 two of which include the Fort
Worth area) and fourteen other counties in North Central Texas,55
shows that as fracing grows in prevalence it will not occur in isola-
tion of human populations.5 6 In Texas, companies are fracing in the
suburbs and even near urbanized areas, causing concerns of gas well
explosions or "twenty-four-hour drilling disrupting the tranquility of
sleepy subdivisions." 57  Individuals and environmental groups in
Colorado, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming have reported con-
cerns that fracing affected drinking water sources. 58 Cities like Bel-
lingham, Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia, in Washington and Portland
available at http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/npc/
03gasstudy/NGVoll_9-25.pdf (concluding with respect to natural gas that "de-
mand is diverse and power generation will drive growth"); Mark Trumbull, Infla-
tion Surge puts Feds in a Quandary, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 17, 2008)
(discussing how "rising oil prices have been a global phenomenon, driven largely
by demand in emerging markets"); David Jolly, Industries Joining Rush to Raise
Prices with 25% Increase, Dow Chemical Adds to a "Global Trend," INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE (June 25, 2008) (discussing how Dow "saw energy and raw
material costs rise 40 percent in the first half of 2008 from a year earlier" and
raised its prices, warning of a 'relentless' rise in energy and raw materials costs.
Dow's chairman and chief executive observed, "Even since our last announce-
ment, the cost of hydrocarbons has continued to rise, and that trajectory shows no
sign of changing").
52. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy:
An "Eventful" Future, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 505, 518 (2006) ("The production of
natural gas from conventional domestic sources in the United States peaked in
1973, just two years after the peak in domestic oil.").
53. United States Senator James M. Inhofe & Frank Fannon, Energy and the
Environment: The Future of Natural Gas in America, 26 ENERGY L.J. 349, 370
(2005).
54. Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas
Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances against Regulatory Takings
Challenges, 32 VT. L. REv. 349, 354 (2007).
55. Railroad Commission of Texas, Barnett Shale Information, available at
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
56. See, e.g., id. (discussing how most of the increased domestic natural gas
production has come from horizontal wells and fracing of shales).
57. Riley, supra note 54, at 354.
58. Id. at 2-5.
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in Oregon "lie in or adjacent to the sub-basins" of the Pacific Coal
Region, 59 and conflicts with human populations could arise if frac-
ing activities grow in these areas. In New York, residents near
Ithaca are pushing for environmentally-oriented fracing processes as
production companies seek oil and gas leases for fracing in that re-
gion's Marcellus Shale.60 Towns in Pennsylvania and southern New
York are also upset by the exploration activities that precede fracing
and drilling: fleets of three to four seismic trucks called "thumpers"
are roaring into quiet communities and striking the ground to map
out the subterranean formations and identify the fracing potential.
Some citizens are threatening legal action if thumping continues.
61
Residents in Alabama have already sued. In Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. EPA ("LEAF') two members of the
Foundation claimed that they experienced diminished water quality
in their drinking well after fracing began in a nearby coalbed.
Fracing near human populations, whether urban or rural, will inevi-
tably generate conflicts. The important question with respect to
regulation is whether these conflicts involve significant environ-
mental and human health-related impacts that are not currently ad-
dressed by regulatory controls.
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FRACING
There have been several national reports on fracing and its poten-
tial impacts on nearby human populations, some sponsored by the
government and others by non-profit associations. Few, however,
have addressed the full range of potential environmental impacts of
fracing. In a survey developed by state agency representatives with
responses from "all of the major coal producing states in which any
coalbed methane gas was produced in 1997," the Ground Water
59. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 5-12.
60. See supra note 44 (discussing proposed well numbers and how
"[1]andowner advocates are asking companies to use a process called 'closed loop
drilling' to recycle waste water at drilling sites").
61. Wilber, supra note 2.
62. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d
1467, 1471 (llth Cir. 1997).
63. Ground Water Protection Council, Survey Results on Inventory and Extent
of Hydraulic Fracturing in Coalbed Methane Wells in the Producing States 3 (Dec.
15, 1998), available at http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/e-librarydocuments/e-
li-
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Protection Council identified only one complaint of drinking water
contamination from hydraulic fracturing - in Alabama - and the
state reported that it investigated the complaint and determined that
it was unsubstantiated. 64 However, the Council's survey did not
address fracing in shale. The Department of Energy prepared a
"Hydraulic Fracturing White Paper" that discusses various technical
fracturing issues, from determination of whether a formation is a
good candidate for fracturing to fluid and proppant selection and
fracture treatment design. 65 The report mentions that "[c]urrently, a
discussion is taking place on the effects of hydraulic fracturing in
coal seams" on U.S. drinking water 66 but does not address these ef-
fects. The EPA cited the white paper, among many other studies, in
a more comprehensive investigation of fracing completed in June of
2004.67 The EPA ended at "Phase I" of the investigation, however,
concluding that the potential effects did not merit more detailed
study.68 Furthermore, the study only addresses one component of
fracing (underground injection of fluids) and one potential environ-
mental effect (contamination of underground sources of drinking
water), and also fails to investigate the effects of fracing in shale. 69
Although the EPA's 2004 study is limited in scope and never
moved beyond Phase I, it provides useful preliminary data on some
of the environmental and human health effects of fracing. Specifi-
cally, the study addresses the potential contamination of under-
ground drinking water in eleven coalbed basins, defining the under-
ground sources pursuant to federal Underground Injection Control
regulations as:
An aquifer or a portion of an aquifer that. .. "[s]upplies
any public water system; or ... [c]ontains [a] sufficient
quantity of groundwater to supply a public water system;
and... currently supplies drinking water for human con-
sumption; or ... contains fewer than 10,000 milligrams
brarydocumentsgeneral/Hydraulic%20fracturing%20methane%20coal%2Obeds.
pdf (hereinafter "GWPC Survey").
64. Id. at 9-10. The Council was preparing a similar survey, but the results
were not yet complete as of Fall 2008. See Richmond, supra note 24.
65. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at App. A-2, A-4, A-11-14.
66. Id. at App. A-1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7-5.
69. Id. at 1-1.
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per liter ... total dissolved solids; and ... [i]s not an ex-
empted aquifer.",
70
Exempted aquifers are those that do not "currently serve as a
source of drinking water" and "cannot now and will not in the future
serve as a source of drinking water" because of contamination,
commercial uses, or physical location or depth. 71 The study investi-
gates both direct and indirect injection of the fluids used in hydraulic
fracturing into underground drinking water. Hydraulic fluid is di-
rectly injected into water in cases where a coalbed is located within
an underground water source, and this practice is common. As the
EPA describes it, "In many coalbed methane-producing regions, the
target coalbeds occur within . . . [underground sources of drinking
water], and the fracturing process injects stimulation fluids directly
into" the underground drinking water source.72 Indirect injection
into underground water sources occurs where the coalbed is adjacent
to a water source; fractures in the coalbed can extend into the adja-
cent source and contaminants may pass through the fractures into the
source.
73
After receiving comments and interviewing citizens and state offi-
cials, as well as reviewing reports historically made by citizens and
citizen representatives to environmental and state organizations, the
EPA summarized "water quality incidents" associated with fracing
in four of the major basins. In the San Juan Basin of Colorado and
New Mexico, a county employee measured methane levels in citi-
zens' homes in response to complaints.74 He reported that he had
found "explosive levels of methane" and "toxic levels of hydrogen
sulfide in homes," likely "due to the removal of water, rather than to
hydraulic fracturing," and that "hundreds of wells ha[d] been af-
fected," likely from "older, poorly cemented wells." 75 In New Mex-
ico, a citizen complained that following the onset of coalbed meth-
ane production, methane levels in his well rose - an observation con-
firmed by the San Juan Regional Authority - and he observed
"streams of gas bubbles in the nearby Los Pinos River."7 6 Other
70. Id. at 1-4, (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 144.3).
71. Id. at 1-5.
72. Id. at 1-6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6-2.
75. Id. at 6-3.
76. Id. at 6-7.
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wells in the area "were also contaminated with methane, and two of
the four residences near the coalbed methane drilling had explosive
levels of methane in their crawl spaces.77 The EPA concluded that
"[t]he methane sampled in the shallow wells and the bubbling river
and the high concentration of methane detected in residences suggest
that coalbed methane was following some conduit from the ...
[coal] formation to the surface or to shallow" underground sources
of drinking water.78 Citizens in Colorado reported that coalbed
methane development had increased methane concentrations in their
water wells, that the water in their well "turned cloudy with grayish
sediment a day or two after nearby fracturing events," that water
flow in their wells decreased after fracturing, and that after wells
were contaminated with methane, they experienced increased levels
of hydrogen sulfide and then anaerobic bacteria.79 There were also
reports of impacts unrelated to drinking water. The EPA toured a
methane coalbed development area in Colorado and observed "areas
where patches of grass and trees were turning brown and dying;"
other areas within the observed zone had old-growth trees, suggest-
ing that "the area previously had prolonged normal soil condi-
tions."8 ° Citizens and local officials complained of higher levels of
methane in the soil and lower levels of air in the soil's shallow root
81
zone.
In Colorado's Fruitland Formation, the EPA reviewed citizen
complaints and state reports and also investigated whether there was
a hydrologic connection between the fracing area and the under-
ground source of drinking water. The EPA concluded that "methane,
fracturing fluid, and water with a naturally high ... [total dissolved
solids] content could possibly move" through "natural fractures" or
"poorly constructed, sealed, or cemented manmade wells used for
various purposes" but that "no reports provide direct information
regarding hydraulic fracturing."
82
In the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, the EPA re-
viewed reports from individuals indicating that after coalbed meth-
ane production, the quantities of water in individuals' wells de-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 6-3, 6-4.
80. Id. at 6-4.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 6-8.
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creased and that there were "flooding problems on the surface." 83 A
consultant reported that some individuals near the basin "had prob-
lems with increased methane content in their water" that caused
"frothing and bubbles" after coalbed methane production com-
menced. 84 Similarly, citizens in the Black Warrior Basin of Ala-
bama complained in their lawsuit that "drinking water contained a
milky white substance and had strong odors shortly after a fracturing
event," and that the water continued to have a bad odor and con-
tained "black coal fines" in the six months following fracing.85 An-
other citizen told the EPA that soon after fracturing, her "kitchen
water had globs of black, jelly-like grease and smelled of petroleum"
- it also "turned brown and contained slimy, floating particles."
86
One homeowner complained of problems with her well caused by
fracing and other "coal resource exploitation," which she also be-
lieved caused "significant environmental damage." 87 She attached a
letter showing that the Alabama Oil and Gas Board had approved
"proppants tagged with radioactive material" for a fracing operation,
based on determinations about the location of drinking water wells
and the depth of fracturing, and another letter from EPA Region 4
showing that it had tested her well for contaminants and had found
"no purgeable and extractable organic compounds" and no petro-
leum products. 88 The EPA also reviewed a report from an individual
to the Natural Resources Defense Council complaining that fluid
from a fracing operation had drained to a site near her home, killing
"all animal and plant life in its path" and that her well was soon
thereafter contaminated with a "petroleum-smelling fluid.",89 An-
other individual reported that after fracing her "water well had be-
come filled with methane gas, causing it to hiss," "the tap water be-
came cloudy, oily, and had a strong, unpleasant odor," and the water
"left behind an oily film and contained fine particles." 90 A private
83. Id. at 6-9.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6-10; see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11 th Cir. 1997) (discussing foundation mem-
bers' claims that their water quality was diminished after fracing).
86. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 6-10.
87. Id.
88. Id.at6-10,6-11.
89. Id. at 6-11.
90. Id.
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consultant, according to the individual's report, "confirmed the pres-
ence of methane." 91
Finally, in the Central Appalachian Basin of Virginia and West
Virginia, the EPA found that "[t]he state received complaints of soap
bubbles flowing from residential household fixtures." The soaps
apparently did not come from fracing but rather from the process of
"extract[ing] drilling cuttings from the borehole." 92 Other individu-
als reported "water loss, soapy water, diesel odors, iron and sulfur in
wells, rashes from showering, gassy taste, and murky water," a
miner "who was burned by a fluid, possibly hydrochloric acid used
in hydraulic fracturing, that infiltrated a mineshaft," fish kills in a
stream "caused by the runoff from drilling fluids," and thousands of
wells going dry "overnight.
93
After considering the complaints in each region, the EPA looked at
state and federal agency responses to these complaints, as well as
compensation to landowners for damages caused by methane coal-
bed drilling. In some cases, agency testing results did not verify the
existence of the contaminants complained of, or that hydraulic frac-
turing had caused the contamination. 94 Some testing results verified
individuals' complaints, 95 while others were inconclusive, as testing
was not conducted until several months after the complaint was
lodged, or a department or agency failed to test for the substance
complained of.96 Drilling companies' responses to citizens' com-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 6-14.
93. Id. at 6-15.
94. For example, in Alabama, where a woman complained of strong odors in
her drinking water as well as black coal fines and a milky substance, water analy-
ses by the Oil and Gas Board, the Alabama Department of Environmental Man-
agement, and EPA Region 4 "indicated that the water well had not been contami-
nated as a result of the fracturing operation." Id. at 6-11.
95. For example, "[o]ne [BLM] study reported that 34 percent of the 205 do-
mestic wells tested in the county showed measurable concentrations of methane."
Id. at 6-6; see also id. at 6-7 (discussing how the San Juan Regional Authority
"confirmed" a man's "report of methane contamination" and found other contami-
nated wells in the area); id. at 6-6. (discussing how BLM sampling showed that
"Fruitland produced water" - water from wells in a shallow aquifer that is "in
hydraulic communication" with coalbeds in a formation in the San Juan Basin -
showed that the water "contained 680 ppm" total dissolved solids, "primarily bi-
carbonate," and that "other domestic wells in the area did not").
96. Another individual in Alabama reported that her well was hissing and full
of methane gas. The EPA observed that Alabama's Oil and Gas Board "tested this
drinking water well, but only looked for naturally occurring contaminants. EPA
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plaints also varied. Some companies provided potable drinking wa-
ter but the individuals felt that this was inadequate compensation for
the loss of their wells.97 In the San Juan Basin, Amoco bought out
several ranches "after county officials tested indoor air and found
extremely high levels of methane." 98  The EPA concluded in its
summary of reported incidents that,
the body of reported problems considered collectively
suggests that water quality (and quantity) problems might
be associated with some of the production activities
common to coalbed methane extraction. These activities
include surface discharge of fracturing and production
fluids, aquifer/formation dewatering, water withdrawal
from production wells, methane migration through con-
duits created by drilling and fracturing practices, or any
combination of these. Other potential sources of drinking
water problems include various aspects of resource de-
velopment, naturally occurring conditions, population
growth and historical practices.99
In the next chapter of the report, however, the EPA found that
"[b]ased on the information collected and reviewed, EPA has con-
cluded that the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into coalbed
methane wells poses little or no threat to... underground sources of
drinking water and does not justify additional study at this time."100
This was despite its earlier observations, in the same chapter, that
"hydraulic fracturing fluids may contain constituents of potential
concern," including "bactericides, acids, diesel fuel, solvents, and/or
alcohols." 10 1 The EPA apparently reconciled this finding with its
conclusion that fracing posed little or no threat to drinking water by
finding that "the largest portion of fracturing fluid constituents is
nontoxic (>95% by volume)" and that "dilution and dispersion, ad-
sorption, and potentially biodegradation, minimize the possibility
also sampled and tested this drinking water well, but not until 6 months after the
event. No mention is made of the analytical results obtained from the drinking
water well by these agencies." Id. at 6-11.
97. Id. at 6-14.
98. Id. at 6-3.
99. Id. at 6-16.
100. Id. at 7-5.
101. Id. at 7-3.
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that chemicals included in the fracturing fluids would adversely af-
fect underground sources of drinking water." 
102
The EPA followed the requisite administrative procedures in con-
ducting the study - publishing a Federal Register notice to request
comments and holding public meetings for stakeholder input, for
example. 103 It also reviewed existing literature; interviewed citizens,
state agencies, other federal agencies, and companies that perform
hydraulic fracturing; visited hydraulic fracturing sites in Colorado,
Kansas, and Virginia; solicited public input on incidents of hydraulic
fracturing that contaminated underground water sources; reviewed
previously- reported groundwater contamination incidents; and com-
piled past reports from individuals on drinking water wells contami-
nated by various coalbed methane activities.1 04 After submitting the
report for peer review, the EPA publicized a draft for public com-
ment, receiving input from 105 commenters and incorporating
"many" comments in the final draft. 105
Despite the apparent procedural validity of the report, which itself
has been questioned, 10 the EPA report has important weaknesses.
First, the report largely ignores environmental issues unrelated to
underground sources of drinking water, as it was aimed at determin-
ing whether fracing should be regulated under the Safe Drinking
Water Act. But fracing has many other potential environmental ef-
102. Id. at7-5.
103. Id. at 2-1.
104. Id. at 2-1 - 2-3, 2-6.
105. Id. at2-7.
106. EPA employees and Members of Congress have questioned the validity of
the report itself and its precursors. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 12, at 1, 5 (refer-
ring to the EPA's fracing report as "scientifically unsound and contrary to the
purposes of the law," including a technical critical analysis of the report, and stat-
ing that "five of EPA's seven-member Peer review Panel appear to have conflicts-
of-interest"); Letter from Henry Waxman, Tom Lantos, Major R. Owns, Edolphus
Towns, Paul E. Kanjorski, Patsy T. Mink, Carolyn B. Maloney, Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Elijah E. Cummings, Dennis J. Kucinich, Rod R. Blagojecvich, Danny K.
Davis, John F. Tiemey, Jim Turner, Thomas H. Allen, Janice D. Schakowsky,
Wm. Lacy Clay, Diane E. Watson and Stephen F. Lynch to Christine Todd Whit-
man (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20040827104747-13515.pdf (writing "to protest that the Administration once
again appears to be altering scientific and policy conclusions to accommodate
Halliburton's interest in promoting the oil and gas drilling practice of 'hydraulic
fracturing"' and arguing that "[s]pecifically, it appears that technical information
that the Administration provided to Congress last week during the energy confer-
ence was manipulated to change data on the risk that hydraulic fracturing could
contaminate underground drinking water supplies").
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fects that citizens have complained of and that the EPA observed but
remain under-researched. In the Powder River Basin, for example, a
consultant for the Powder River Basin Resource Council reported
that "the biggest concern among people in the area is loss of water"
and "[m]any of the [citizen] complaints relate to water quantity is-
sues; the EPA considered such issues to be "beyond the scope of ...
[its] study." 107  Water quantity issues are, however, an important
environmental concern, as are potential bums caused by hydrochlo-
ric acid used in fracing, fish kills, and "brown and dying" grass and
trees. 10 8 Although the EPA is not at fault for focusing on drinking
water quality issues, since its objective was to determine whether
fracing should be regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the
narrowness of the EPA's conclusion is sometimes forgotten when
proponents of fracing use the report as evidence that fracing has pur-
portedly "no" environmental effects.
Second, and related to the EPA's narrow focus on underground
drinking water quality issues, is the narrowness of the EPA's causal
analysis. The EPA investigated only whether the injection of hydrau-
lic fluids undermined underground drinking water quality. 109 But its
report alludes to other steps in the fracing process unrelated to injec-
tion that can also contaminate underground drinking water, and it
fails to fully analyze these steps. The report states, for example,
It is important to note that activities or conditions other
than hydraulic fracturing fluid injection may account for
some of the reported incidences of the contamination of
drinking water wells. These potential causes include sur-
face discharge of fracturing and production fluids, poorly
sealed or poorly installed production wells, and improp-
erly abandoned production wells. 110
Just as the report focuses solely on the effects of underground injec-
tion of fracing fluids on drinking water and should therefore not be
107. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 6-9.
108. Id. at 6-4, 6-15.
109. See id. at 6-1 ("This study is specifically focused on assessing the potential
for contamination of USDWs from the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into
coalbed methane wells, and determining based on these findings, whether further
study is warranted.").
110. Id. at 6-1, 6-2.
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used to conclude that fracing is not dangerous, I"' the report does not
include an in-depth study of fracing's non-injection-related effects
on drinking water and should not be read otherwise.
Directly related to issues of non-injection activities that may cause
groundwater contamination is the question of separating out the ef-
fects of fracing from the effects of other drilling activities. The
EPA's report concludes that "the body of reported problems consid-
ered collectively suggests that water ... problems might be associ-
ated with some of the production activities common to coalbed
methane extraction," one of which is fracing. 112 In other words, the
EPA concedes in its report that it had difficulty determining whether
the environmental effects observed and discussed were caused by
fracing, other activities associated with coalbed methane production,
or some combination of fracing and other production activities. This
difficulty is highlighted elsewhere in its discussion of reported inci-
dents. In the San Juan basin, the EPA found:
The history of documented gas seeps and methane occur-
rence in water wells indicates that natural fractures
probably serve as conduits in parts of the basin where
coal formations are near or at the surface and in the inte-
rior of the basin, where the coal formations are deeper.
These conduits may enable hydraulic fracturing fluids to
travel from targeted coalbeds to shallow aquifers. How-
ever, there is no unequivocal evidence that this fluid
movement is occurring and, even given the presence of
these possible conduits, other hydrogeologic conditions
(such as certain pressure gradients, etc.) would be re-
quired for fluid movement from targeted coalbeds to shal-
low aquifers. 11
3
111. Some associations have reached this conclusion based on the EPA's report.
See, e.g., American Exploration and Production Council, Hydraulic Fracturing:
Action Needed to Remove Regulatory Uncertainty (Oct. 10, 2003), available at
http://axpc.org/policy/031010.pdf (finding that "a 2002 draft comprehensive EPA
study of coalbed methane hydraulic fracturing environmental risks found no con-
tamination problems and no need for any further study of the matter. Again, no
environmental risks of proper hydraulic fracturing have been identified").
112. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 6-16.
113. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 6-8.
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The multiple factors that contribute to well contamination suggest
that further research on the extent to which fracing contributes to
contamination is important - not that fracing, as one factor among
many, has unsubstantial effects.
In addition to studies by the Ground Water Protection Council and
the EPA, several brief investigative reports on fracing and its effects
on the national scale have been prepared by environmental groups.
In 2002, the Natural Resources Defense Council concluded that
"[t]he greatest concern about the hydraulic fracturing of coalbed
methane wells is that the fracturing fluids being pumped into ground




The report suggested that "20% to 30%" of the hazardous fluids
"may remain in the ground"'1 15 and summarized a number of land-
owner complaints related to fracing, including complaints from citi-
zens in Alabama (three complaints), Virginia (more than 100 docu-
mented complaints), Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana." 6
Earthworks, through its Oil and Gas Accountability Project, has
studied the effects of fracing with respect to drinking water contami-
nation. Its report, Our Drinking Water at Risk, published in 2005,
critiques the EPA's conclusions and lists numerous fracing-related
concerns. The report concludes - generally relying upon the EPA's




- that hazardous fracing fluids are a threat to human health even
when diluted, that many fluids are injected directly into underground
sources of drinking water or migrate to nearby underground water,
and that some fracing fluids are left "stranded" in fraced formations,
meaning they could contaminate groundwater far into the future as
the water table rises.1 18 The Accountability Project's report further
finds that waste fluids from fracing are often injected into drinking
water sources, despite at least one fracing company having recom-
114. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF
COALBED METHANE WELLS: A THREAT TO DRINKING WATER 2 (Jan. 2002),
available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/200201_NRDCHydrFrac_
CBM.pdf.
115. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 6-8.
116. Id. at 2-3, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOO/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudyattach-uic-ch02_methodology.pdf.
117. See Wilson, supra note 12.
118. LISA SuMI, OUR DRINKING WATER AT RISK: WHAT EPA AND THE OIL AND
GAS INDUSTRY DON'T WANT US TO KNOW, OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT vii-viii (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/
pubs/DrinkingWaterAtRisk.pdf.
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mended that they be disposed of as hazardous wastes, and that citi-
zens in many states have complained of well contamination caused
by fracing, again referring to the EPA's report." 
9
Some citizens have also individually testified to negative health ef-
fects possibly caused by fracing. At a congressional hearing in
2007, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum of Denver testified that "[t]here have
been documented complaints by residents of the area. There are also
anecdotal stories of medical problems in those exposed." 121 Steve
Mobaldi, formerly a resident of a ten-acre ranch in Rifle, Colorado,
testified that after a company "began drilling on a property about
3,000 feet to the west," he and his wife "began to experience burning
eyes and nosebleeds." "Later," his wife "began to experience fa-
tigue, headaches, hand numbness, bloody stools, rashes, and welts
on her skin. When she showered she would turn red, tiny blisters
covered her entire body." "Soon after she was diagnosed with
chemical exposure but the doctor was unaware of what the chemicals
were that were causing her symptoms." Steve "began to experience
rectal bleeding." He also testified that he planted trees on his prop-
erty, but they died. In 1997, an oil and gas company informed Mr.
Mobaldi and his wife that "a natural gas well was being placed
across the street and drilling was going to go under [their] property."
After drilling began, his wife "lost her voice and got headaches,
burning eyes." Drilling ended in 1998, but "the neighbors' water
well had exploded when fracing fluid spewed causing them to
evacuate their home." Mr. Mobaldi further testified that employees
of the oil and gas company "told us to stop drinking our water." The
"water would fizz like soda with small bubbles." "Sand began to
accumulate in our water. If you set a glass of water out overnight an
oily thin film would float on top." He also reported that in 2001, his
water well "had to be reinstalled ten feet higher because the sand
was filling the water well shut."'
121
There have also been sporadic news reports on fracing accidents
that have gone unreported to public officials - suggesting that con-
119. Id. at viii (In September 2003, the Council's Board signed a resolution
declaring that "the Ground Water Protection Council... supported and continues
to support USEPA's position that hydraulic fracturing is not underground injection
under the ... [Safe Drinking Water Act]").
120. Committee on Oversight and Gov't Reform, Oil and Gas Exemptions in
Fed. Envtl. Prots., Video of the Hearing, available at http://oversight.house.gov/




clusions that there have been few citizen complaints (as determined
by the Ground Water Protection Council's survey, 122 for example)
may fail to account for the fact that citizens sometimes complain to
environmental agencies or local lawyers as opposed to state regula-
tors. In August 2008, for example, Newsweek reported that an em-
ployee of an energy-services company in Colorado allegedly "caught
in a 'fracturing fluid' spill" arrived in the emergency room "com-
plaining of nausea and headaches." The emergency room nurse who
treated the employee "began vomiting and retaining fluid" several
days later, and her skin turned yellow. She was diagnosed with
chemical poisoning, which she believes was from the fracing fluid
she encountered. The material safety data sheet for the fracing fluid,
although it contained several unrevealed "confidential compounds"
for proprietary reasons, indicated that the fluid contained methanol
and that "[p]rolonged exposure can cause kidney and liver damage,
irritate lung tissue, decrease blood pressure, and result in dizziness
and vomiting." Newsweek reported that "not a single incident report
was filed with any government agency by . . .[the companies in-
volved] documenting the.., spill" that led to the employee's emer-
gency room visit. 123
All of the reports and articles prepared to-date, whether sponsored
by a government agency or a non-profit group, suggest that, at least
in some regions, fracing has potential environmental effects, such as
the contamination of groundwater through direct injection or migra-
tion to nearby formations, diminution of groundwater quantities,
surface and groundwater contamination from disposal of fracing flu-
ids, and contamination of the surface soil and vegetation. Further-
more, there is a strong consensus against one practice: fracing with
diesel fuel. Although the Ground Water Protection Council opposes
federal regulation of underground injection of fracing fluids under
the Safe Drinking Water Act,124 the Council objects to the use of
diesel fuel as fluid used for hydraulic fracturing. It signed a resolu-
tion in September 2002 urging "the oil and gas industry to discon-
122. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
123. Jim Moscou, A Toxic Spew?: Officials Worry About Impact of 'Fracking'
of Oil and Gas, NEWSWEEK Web Exclusive, Aug. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/154394 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
124. Ground Water Protection Council, Resolution 03-5, Requesting Legislative
Clarification of the Definition of "Underground Injection" in the Safe Drinking
Water Act, available at http://www.gwpc.org/advocacy/documents/resolutions/
RES-03-5.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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tinue the use of diesel fuel" as a fracturing fluid in underground
sources of drinking water. 125  Three industry groups purportedly
stopped injecting diesel fuel directly into coalbeds with underground
sources of drinking water after they signed a memorandum of
agreement with the EPA, 126 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ex-
empted all forms of fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act with
the exception of diesel fuel. 1
27
Aside from general agreement over the dangerousness of diesel
fuel used in fracing, as well as acknowledgment that fracing has
some environmental effects, there is an ongoing debate as to the se-
riousness and prevalence of these effects - in part because the effects
are under-researched to-date, which in turn perhaps partially is due
to some companies' opposition to further study. 128 The rapid expan-
sion of fracing has not allowed researchers to keep up, and the ef-
fects of fracing vary widely by region, making a comprehensive and
thorough study difficult. One member of the Ground Water Protec-
tion Council Board, for example, urges that the Oil and Gas Ac-
countability's Report does not sufficiently break down effects based
on the type of formation being fraced; while fracing in a shallow
coalbed may present concerns, he says, fracing in a formation like
Montana's Bakken Shale, far from most underground sources of
drinking water and with a strong barrier between the formation and
the water where sources exist, is relatively benign, 129 at least with
125. Ground Water Protection Council, Resolution 02-2, Concerning the Use of
Diesel Fuel in Fracturing Fluids in Underground Sources of Drinking Water,
available at http://www.gwpc.org/advocacy/documents/resolutions/resolution__
02-2.htm (last visited 8/26/2008).
126. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
127. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Comm'n, Hydraulic Fracturing,
available at http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Feb. 25,
2009) (urging that "[e]ffective state regulation has made hydraulic fracturing a
safe and environmentally-sound way to maximize and conserve our nations [sic]
natural resources"); American Exploration and Production Council, supra note
111 (urging that in 1974, when Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act,
"[b]y then hydraulic fracturing had been used for 25 years with no environmental
problems" and that "no environmental risks of proper hydraulic fracturing have
been identified"); American Petroleum Institute, Hydraulic Fracturing at a Glance,
available at http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/upload/
HYDRAULICFRACTINDIVIDPAGES.pdf ("Current industry well design
practices ensure multiple levels of protection between any sources of drinking
water and the production zone of an oil and gas well.").
129. See Richmond, supra note 24.
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respect to groundwater contamination. The deepest freshwater for-
mation in the Bakken Shale area, according to Tom Richmond, Ad-
ministrator of Montana's Oil and Gas Board, has a maximum depth
of about 1,500 feet. This creates about 7,000 feet of separation be-
tween the shale that is fraced and the lowest portion of the drinking
water. Further, there are several hundred feet of salt between the
shale and drinking water formations, and salt is an effective barrier
to contamination. Salt cannot be effectively fraced because even if
fractured for a short time, it collapses and quickly "heals" - the frac-
tures do not remain. 130  And Steve Sasaki, Chief Field Inspector
with Montana's Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, believes that
fracing service companies in Montana have been using relatively
non-intrusive fluids - mostly a gel water sand frac, with the gel con-
sisting of a drilling mud or a polymer.' 3 1 Ted Loukides, a Mineral
Resources Specialist with the New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, makes a similar point and has emphasized
to citizens that there is no coalbed methane drilling in New York.
Fracing in New York occurs in shale "thousands of feet blow drink-
ing water," he explains. And while there have been citizen com-
plaints in the western United States, he believes that many of the
impacts complained of are more related to surface mismanagement
of fracing fluid than the actual fracturing of the formation.1 32 In-
variably, effects will differ by region, by the type of operation and
disposal methods used, and the type of formation fraced.
The Accountability Project's report, however, is not the only one
that suffers from a failure to fully investigate the range of environ-
mental impacts by region. No report has sufficiently investigated
and compared the effects of fracing in the many formations currently
being tapped for oil or gas. The EPA's report studied fracing in
eleven different coalbeds, but it did not investigate shales, where
much of fracing boom is now occurring. 133 While there is specific
data on effects in some regions, as evidenced by the EPA's discus-
sion of citizen complaints and some testing results in four different
coalbed fracing regions, none of it has been thoroughly and compre-
hensively analyzed side-by-side. The current data can typically only
130. Id.
131. See Sasaki, supra note 9.
132. See Telephone Interview with Ted Loukides, Mineral Resources Specialist,
N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Div. of Mineral Resources (Sept. 10, 2008)
(notes on file with author).
133. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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tell us that there are effects, some more serious than others; that they
differ depending on a number of factors, including the region and the
type of fluid used; and that there have been a number of citizen
complaints that fracing has contaminated their wells or otherwise
affected their property.
IV. CURRENT REGULATION OF FRACiNG: A STATE-CENTRIC PROCESS
Although the environmental effects of fracing vary by region and
practice, there are some known trends. As discussed in Part II, frac-
ing has generated citizen complaints in a number of states - not all
related to drinking water - and "[i]n many coalbed methane-
producing states, the target coalbeds [for fracing] occur within" un-
derground sources of drinking water.134 Contamination of drinking
water sources with concentrations of gases similar to the concentra-
tion in coalbeds in these areas has been identified, although there is
insufficient information to determine whether fracing has caused or
extended the connections between coal formation and underground
water sources. 135 Beyond this, the literature on the environmental
effects is scarce. And just as the effects vary and are in some cases
unknown, the regulation of fracing throughout the United States is
spotty.
A. The Lack of Federal Regulation
The debate over federal environmental regulations' application to
fracing simmered for a time 136 before coming to a head in the Elev-
enth Circuit, where an environmental group argued that the EPA
should regulate fracing under the Safe Drinking Water Act's Under-
ground Injection Control regulations. 137 Under the Safe Drinking
134. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 1-6, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewa-
ter/uic/ pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic chOlintro.pdf.
135. Id. at 6-6, 6-7, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudyattach uic ch06_waterqualincidents.pdf.
136. In 1990, for example, an EPA report found that "there is a growing poten-
tial for contamination of drinking water aquifers," primarily due to fracing; Legal
Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 1471
(11 th Cir. 1997) (quoting UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
GROUND WATER STUDY CoMMITrEE: REPORT Gil-STUDY WELL
CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS; PARTICULARLY PROBLEMS RELATED TO COAL BED
METHANE 1 (1990), appearing at R3-21 1).
137. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1469.
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Water Act, the EPA establishes minimum regulatory requirements
for Underground Injection Control to be implemented by states and,
once the states' programs are approved by the EPA, states retain
primary responsibility for administering an Underground Injection
Control program unless they fail to meet the minimum require-
ments. 138 At the time of the case, state Underground Injection Con-
trol programs were to prohibit unauthorized "'underground injec-
tion,"' defined as "'the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well
injection."",139 The EPA approved Alabama's program in 1982 for
Class II wells - "'[w]ells which inject fluids: (1) [w]hich are brought
to the surface in connection with ... conventional oil or natural gas
production ...; (2) [f]or enhanced recovery of oil or natural gas; and
(3) [fjor storage of hydrocarbons,' ' 140 giving the State Oil and Gas
Board of Alabama the responsibility of administering that program.
In 1983 the EPA approved Alabama's Underground Injection Con-
trol program for the remainder of the wells (Classes I, III, V, and
VI), to be administered by the Alabama Department of Environ-
mental Management. 14 1  State agencies administering these pro-
grams did not believe that wells used for hydraulic fracturing in Ala-
bama coalbeds - several thousand of which had been developed at
the time of the case - fell within the definition of any of the wells
regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act. 142 The Legal Environ-
mental Assistance Foundation accordingly petitioned the EPA to
"initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the Alabama ... [Un-
derground Injection Control] program," alleging that the program
was "deficient" due to its failure to regulate hydraulic fracturing for
methane gas production 143 and that two of its members had experi-
enced diminished drinking water quality after fracing. 144 The EPA
denied the Foundation's petition, concluding that the "principal
function" of methane gas wells used for hydraulic fracturing is not
"underground injection" as defined by the Underground Injection
Control regulations. 45 It also disagreed with the Foundation's claim
138. Id. at 1469-70.
139. Id. at 1470 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1), citing 40 C.F.R. §
145.1 l(a)(5)).
140. Id. at 1469-70 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 144.6(b)).
141. Id. at 1470.
142. Id. at 1471.
143. Id. at 1470.
144. Id. at 1471.
145. Id.
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that drinking water was contaminated as a result of hydraulic fractur-
ing. 146 The Foundation then filed a petition for review of the EPA's
order denying the Foundation's petition with the Eleventh Circuit. 1
47
The court found that the language of the Safe Drinking Water Act
requiring that state Underground Injection Control programs ap-
proved by the EPA "'shall prohibit.. .any underground injection in
such State which is not authorized by a permit issued by the State
(except that the regulations may permit a State to authorize under-
ground injection by rule)"' 14 8 gave a "'straightforward statutory
command"' 149 and "dictated that all underground injection be regu-
lated under the UIC programs."' 150  Accordingly, the court granted
the Foundation's petition for review of the EPA's denial of the
Foundation's petition to initiate proceedings to withdraw Alabama's
UIC program as a result of the program's failure to regulate fracing
and remanded the case to the EPA. 1 Alabama eventually incorpo-
rated fracing into its UIC regulations under a portion of the Safe
Drinking Water Act that applied to secondary recovery of resources,
which the EPA and the court accepted.1
52
Following LEAF, the EPA commenced a study to determine
whether the Safe Drinking Water Act should apply to fracing. Sev-
eral industry groups encouraged the EPA to conclude that it should
not apply and lobbied Congress to exempt fracing from the Act,
153
146. Id
147. Id. at 1472.
148. Id. at 1474 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A)).
149. Id. at 1475 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)).
150. Id. at 1474.
151. Id. at 1478.
152. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 431-32; see also Markus G. Puder & Michel
J. Paque, Tremors in the Cooperative Environmental Federalism Arena: What
Happens When a State Wants to Assume Only Portions of a Primacy Program or
Return a Primacy Program? - The Underground Injection Control Program Un-
der the Safe Drinking Water Act as a Case Study, 24 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL.
L. 71, 88, 163 (2005) (discussing the approval of Alabama's Class II UIC Program
Revision 65 Fed. Reg. 2889 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 147), and Legal Envtl. Assis-
tance, 276 F.3d 1253 (11 th Cir. 2001) (affirming approval of Alabama's program
under Section 1425 of the Safe Drinking Water Act)).
153. See, e.g., American Exploration and Production Council, supra note 111
(stating that "[i]ndustry, working primarily through both its Washington and state
based trade associations, has pressed for a legislative resolution of the issue" and
urging that legislation should "allow states to continue their effective regulation of
hydraulic fracturing"); Independent Petroleum Association of America, Testimony
of the Independent Petroleum Association of America and the National Stripper
Well Association before the Environmental Protection Agency Regarding Under-
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while environmental groups argued for federal regulation. 5 4 Ulti-
mately, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempted all fracing with the
exception of diesel fuel from the definition of underground injection
in Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, providing:
The term "underground injection"-
(A) means the subsurface emplacement of fluids by
well injection; and
(B) excludes-
(i) the underground injection of natural gas for pur-
poses of storage; and
(ii) the underground injection of fluids or propping
agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geother-
mal production activities. 155
Although the Act conclusively withdrew fracing from the realm of
federal regulation, the debate over fracing has not died. Several en-
vironmental groups have continued to push for federal regulation, 156
while industry and states argue that the Energy Policy Act reached
the right result. The Chairman of Texas' Railroad Commission, for
example, testified before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce in February 2005 that "regulations at the Federal level
would not result in cleaner water but only in adding significant cost"
and applauded "the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in
ground Injection Control (UIC) (Aug. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.ipaa.org/issues/testimony/HydraulicFracturing.asp (last visited Feb.
25, 2009) (urging that "[t]he sheer magnitude of fracturing jobs is indicative that
no environmental problem exists that is not already controlled under existing state
programs," opposing a "study of the magnitude EPA is proposing," and arguing
that "EPA does not need an 18 month or 2 year or 3 year effort to assess the 're-
ports' of alleged problems associated with hydraulic fracturing").
154. The Wilderness Society, Too Wild to Drill: Hydraulic Fracturing Threat-
ens Drinking Water, available at http://www.wilderness.org/Library/ Docu-
ments/upload/Too-Wild-to-Drill-Hydraulic-Fracturing-Threatens-Driniking-
Water.pdf (arguing that exemption of fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act
"is bad environmental policy").
155. Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109 th Cong. (Jan. 4, 2005).
156. See, e.g., Earthworks, Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and Gas Wells, avail-
able at http://www.earthworksaction.org/hydfracking.cfin (last visited Feb. 25,
2009) (arguing that "[t]he oil and gas industry is the only industry in America that
is allowed by EPA to inject known hazardous materials - unchecked - directly into
or adjacent to underground drinking water supplies").
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this respect." 157 The Independent Petroleum Association of America
wrote in a bulletin summing up the political year, "The Safe Drink-
ing Water Act was clarified to prevent new federal regulation threat-
ened by a 1997 decision - a significant success given the increas-
ingly important use of hydraulic fracturing."' 5 8 Despite the debate,
the Energy Policy Act remains. As such, aside from the possibility
of sporadic application of federal statutes, 159 control lies in the
states.
B. Fracing in the Courts: A Focus on Trespass and Ownership, not
Environmental Effects, with Potential Opportunities for Nuisance
The dearth of federal regulation of fracing would be less of a con-
cern if courts systematically addressed, through the common law or
interpretation of state statutes, problems caused by fracing. Courts
have, however, generally played a narrow role. As a relatively new
technology, 160 fracing has come before courts in only a limited num-
ber of cases, typically presenting ownership, pooling, and trespass
questions as well as related damages issues. No state cases appear
to have directly addressed claims of environmental damage caused
by fracing.
In Utah, the state supreme court addressed a fracing-related pool-
ing issue (forced "sharing" of resources underlying different tracts of
157. Railroad Commission of Texas, Testimony Submitted to the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce by Victor Carrillo, Chairman, Texas Railroad
Commission Representing the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (Feb.
10, 2005), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/commissioners/carillo/press/
energytestimony.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
158. Independent Petroleum Association of America, Turning the Page on En-
ergy Policy, available at http://www.ipaa.org/issues/factsheets/energy_policy/
TurningthePageonEnergyPolicy 1 0-2005.pdf.
159. The Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act could potentially apply.
See, e.g., N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 459 F.Supp. 2d 1102,
1107, 1114, 1131 (D.N.M. 2006) (memorandum opinion) (discussing plaintiffs'
Endangered Species Act claim when challenging BLM's approval of a Resource
Management Plan and an oil and gas lease for an operation that included hydraulic
fracturing); Tex. Oil and Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 928-29 (5th Cir. 1998)
(discussing plaintiffs' challenges, under the Clean Water Act, to EPA regulations
for the Coastal Subcategory of the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category,
which addressed, among other pollutants, "slurried particles that surface from
hydraulic fracturing" and from other parts of the production operation); see also
infra note 282 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 15 at 33 ("[flracture treatment technology in coals seams is
just now starting to evolve").
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land, in order to prevent one owner from obtaining an unfair portion
of resources from an underground reservoir) in the "Drunkards Wash
Field," part of a coalbed methane-producing formation. 161  The
River Gas Corporation created an exploratory unit 162 and attempted
several times to lease private lands in the area, but the landowners
refused. Notably, River Gas did not alert the landowners to the fact
that it was drilling other wells in the area and that a large percentage
of the drainage field was beneath their property. 163 River Gas drilled
a well closer to the landowners' tract than was permitted by the Utah
Administrative Code, failing to obtain consent from the landowners,
and Utah's Bureau of Land Management office mistakenly approved
the well. 164 One of the landowners noticed the well when he was
working on his land, and the landowners leased their land to
Hegarty, hoping to offset the drilling and fracing and protect their
interests. 165 Hegarty and River Gas attempted but failed to agree on
a voluntary pooling arrangement, and Hegarty sought Board action
on pooling, requesting that pooling be made retroactive. 166  The
Utah Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining denied retroactive pooling. 
167
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of retroactive pool-
ing, finding that although the landowners had not received official
notice of the drilling, "[lI]andowners knew their correlative ri hts, or
at least had notice to inquire after them" but failed to do so. Fur-
thermore, although "[m]ethane gas recovery in the. . .[Drunkard
Wash Unit] has involved depressurization, hydraulic fracturing, and
draining," of the gas from beneath the landowners' property, mean-
ing that River Gas could have entered an agreement for cooperative
development, it was not required to do so: the Utah statute did not
require pooling agreements and was merely permissive. 169 In SUM,
"parties in possession of the necessary information to act in protec-
tion of their own rights bear the responsibility for doing so," and
there was no mandatory pooling. 170 The landowners failed to protect
161. Hegarty v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, Dep't of Natural Res., 57 P.3d
1042, 1044 (Utah 2002).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1045.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1048 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(11) (1993)).
167. Id. at 1046.
168. Id. at 1050.
169. Id. at 1051 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-7(1) (1998)).
170. Id. at 1051-52.
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their interests, the court concluded, and could not obtain retroactive
pooling. 1 71
In Pennsylvania, the Superior Court in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge
172
addressed the question of who owns coalbed gas and indirectly
reached related trespass issues. U.S. Steel owned coal in Greene
County, and two separate parties owned the surface of two tracts
overlying the coal.173 These parties' predecessors had relinquished
the right to the coal through severance deeds, reserving the "right to
drill and operate through said coal for oil and gas without being held
liable for any damages." 174 The surface owners leased "all of the oil
and gas and all of the constituents of either in and under" the surface
to Cunningham, the gas and oil lessee, who promised to give one-
eighth of all methane gas, casing gas, and gas "produced and sold"
under the surface to the surface owners/lessors. 175  U.S. Steel in-
tended to mine coal in a coal seam underlying the two tracts but then
learned that Cunningham had begun drilling for coalbed gas in the
coal seam and planned to use hydrofracturing to increase production.
It brought an action for trespass and urged that it owned the coalbed
gas in the coal seam.1 76 The Superior Court concluded, based on the
deed language, that in purchasing the coal, U.S. Steel had not pur-
chased the coalbed gas, although it could "exploit the coalbed gas
released in its mining operations,"' 177 thus finding in favor of the sur-
face owners. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding that
"as a general rule, subterranean gas is owned by whoever has title to
the property in which the gas is resting" but that "[w]hen a land-
owner conveys a portion of his property, in this instance coal, to an-
other, it cannot thereafter be said that the property conveyed remains
as part of the former's land, since title to the severed property rests
solely in the grantee." 178 It concluded that
such gas as is present in coal must necessarily belong to
the owner of the coal, so long as it remains within his
171. Id. at 1051.
172. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 450 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (rev'd by
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983)). For discussion of reversal,
see infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 163-64.
174. Id. at 164.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 165.
177. Id. at 172.
178. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983).
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property and subject to his exclusive dominion and con-
trol. The landowner, of course, has title to the property
surrounding the coal, and owns such of the coalbed gas as
migrates into the surrounding property. 
179
As such, it determined, "[T]he coal owner may mine his coal, extract
the gas from it, or both. If he chooses to extract the gas, drilling as
well as hydrofracturing are available means, so long as their utiliza-
tion does not impinge upon the rights of owners of the surrounding
property."' 180 U.S. Steel clarifies the rights that belong to coal own-
ers as opposed to surface owners - giving the coal owners the right
to frac or use other creative extraction techniques, provided this does
not impinge excessively on the surface owner's rights - but leaves
open the question of whether coal owners who choose to frac to ex-
tract coalbed gas may induce fractures in neighboring subsurface
property without being liable for trespass.
A recent landmark Texas case, Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust,181 decided this issue, at least partially, in the affirma-
tive. In an opinion finding that trespass damages for gas royalties
lost due to drainage from fracing are not recoverable, 182 one concur-
ring justice wrote that fracing is simply not a trespass, no matter
what types of damages are sought.183 This case is likely to influence
not only the state of the hydraulic fracturing business in Texas but
also future decisions, as other jurisdictions will look to a court in the
heart of oil and gas country for guidance. In Coastal Oil, the Salinas
family and other respondents (which the court refers to collectively
as "Salinas") owned "Share 13," a 748-acre tract of land in Hidalgo
County. 184 Because Salinas leased the minerals on Share 13 to a
production company, Salinas had a "royalty interest and the possibil-
ity of reverter" in the minerals.' 85  Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.
("Coastal") leased the minerals on Share 13 as well as the adjacent
tracts, Share 15 and Share 12. It later acquired the mineral estate on
Share 12. A natural gas reservoir called the Vicksburg T formation
179. Id. (emphasis original).
180. Id. at 1384.
181. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
2008).
182. Id. at 13.
183. Id. at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 9.
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underlies all three tracts.' 86 The reservoir "is a 'tight' sandstone for-
mation," meaning that fracing is necessary for commercial produc-
tion of natural gas from the reservoir.1 87 Coastal used fracing to drill
three wells on Share 13 and a highly productive fourth well close to
the Share 12-Share 13 border. Coastal drilled another well very
close to the same border, this time on Share 12, and yet another well
close to the border on Share 13. Pursuant to Railroad Commission
requirements, it shut in one well on Share 12 that was close to the
border, as the Commission was concerned that two adjacent wells on
Share 12 would drain natural gas from Share 13.188 Despite this
shut-in to alleviate drainage concerns, Salinas sued Coastal, arguing
that it had breached its implied covenants by failing to develop Share
13 and by failing to prevent drainage from Share 13, urging that gas
from Share 13 was draining to Share 12. Coastal commenced a
"flurry of drilling" on Share 13.189 For one well on the northeast
corner of Share 12, "the fracing hydraulic length was designed to
reach over 1,000 feet from the well," while "the farthest distance to
the Share 13 lease line was 660 feet."'190 Fractures from the well on
Share 12, in other words, would most certainly extend onto Share
13. Neither party was certain as to how far the fractures extended
onto Share 13, although they agreed that the fractures were longer
than 660 feet.191 Salinas asserted, among other claims, that Coastal
trespassed by fracing the well on Share 13 and draining gas from the
reservoir. 192 Salinas' expert testified that 25-35% of the gas that the
well on Share 12 produced through fracing consisted of gas drained
from Share 13.193
Addressing the respondents' trespass claim, the Texas Supreme
Court looked not directly at trespass but rather to the rule of capture,
which "gives a mineral rights owner title to the oil and gas produced
from a lawful well bottomed on the property, even if the oil and gas
flowed to the well from beneath another owner's tract," a rule that is
"fundamental both to property rights and to state regulation."'
194
186. Id. at 5.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 7.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id. at 8.
194. Id. at 13.
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Under this rule, the court observed, the adjacent landowner who may
be harmed by a nearby operating well has remedies to prevent that
well from draining away all of the gas underlying her property. She
may drill an offset well herself, or, if she has leased the mineral
rights on her property, she may sue the mineral lessee to drill a well
to uphold the covenant to protect against drainage. 195 In some cases,
an offset well may still not protect against drainage, in which case
the adjacent landowner may offer to pool, wherein some of the adja-
cent landowner's land is added to land where there are other wells
draining the gas beneath her property. The landowner receives a
share of the royalties, or whatever other rights the lease may afford
her, in the oil or gas produced from all of the pooled wells.1 96 If her
offer is rejected, the Railroad Commission may force pooling. 197
The court observed that "the rule of capture determines title to gas
that drains from property owned by one person onto property owned
by another" and is justified because of the many remedies available
to the adjacent owner. 198 It found no reason for why the rule should
not apply to coalbed gas and concluded that "[t]he rule of capture
makes it possible for the [Railroad] Commission, through rules gov-
erning the spacing, density, and allowables of wells, to protect cor-
relative rights of owners with interests in the same mineral deposits
while securing 'the state's goals of preventing waste and conserving
natural resources."'' 199 In sum, given the strength of this rule and its
clear applicability to the gas at issue in the case, the court deter-
mined that under the rule of capture, the gas underlying respondents'
property did not in fact "belong" to respondents. Under this view,
damages for gas drained from beneath one property by fracing - a
process that also extends fractures, fracing fluids, and proppants be-
195. Id. at 14.
196. Id.; see also Daniel F. Sullivan, Annotation, Implied Duty of Oil and Gas
Lessee to Prot. Against Drainage, 18 A.L.R.4th 14 § 14 (1982) (discussing the
"pooling" cases that support the principle that "in appropriate circumstances, the
implied duty of an oil and gas lessee to protect the leased premises against drain-
age of oil or gas by wells operated on other lands includes a duty to attempt to
create a pool or unit whereby some or all of the lessor's land is combined with the
land on which the draining well or wells are located and the oil or gas produced by
such wells is allocated among the lands included in the pool or unit").
197. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex.
2008).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 15 (quoting Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 226
S.W.3d 383, 389 (Tex. 2007)).
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neath those properties - is not an actionable trespass but rather an
activity properly governed by the rule of capture and its associated
remedies. 20 ? In looking to the strength of the rule, the court also
emphasized the power of the Railroad Commission to provide reme-
dies where the rule creates problems and gave deference to those
remedies, finding, "No one suggests that these various remedies pro-
vide inadequate protection against drainage."
20 1
Three justices concurred in the opinion but did not join in the tres-
pass portion of the opinion. These three justices would not have re-
lied on the rule of capture but would have first looked directly at the
trespass issue - asking whether "hydraulic fracturing across lease
lines constitute[s] subsurface trespass. 20 2  In Texas, they empha-
sized, "the underlying premise is that a landowner owns the miner-
als, including oil and gas, underneath his property., 20 3 The rule of
capture - permitting another entity to capture oil and gas - applies
only where that entity legally captures the oil and gas. An operation
like fracing cannot be a legal method of capture if it is a trespass.2 4
The three concurring justices did not conclude whether fracing is a
trespass but suggested that it may be, pointing out that deviated
wells - those that cross onto adjacent property - are a trespass in
Texas, and that both fracing and deviated wells "involve a lease op-
erator's intentional actions which result in inserting foreign materials
without permission into a second lease, draining minerals by means
of the foreign materials, and 'capturing' the minerals on the first
lease. 20 5
Coastal Oil only addressed the question of whether "incursion of
hydraulic fracturing fluid and proppants into another's land two
miles below the surface constitutes a trespass" and whether the
owner, through trespass, could recover damages for the royalties the
owner would have recovered from the gas beneath his land drained
by fracing.2 °6 The only injury asserted by the respondents in
Coastal Oil was the loss of gas through drainage, not that the exten-
200. Id.
201. Id. at 14.
202. Id. at 44 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 43 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 43-44 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Id. at 44 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Id. at 9.
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sion of fractures and fracing fluid underneath the property damaged
his land or deposited materials on the surface.207
Other state cases have addressed practices that, like fracing, re-
quire the introduction of off-site substances beneath a property in
order to extract oil or gas. These, too, tend to give the benefit of the
doubt to the producer, looking to the central purpose of oil and gas
leases, which is "obtaining production" or, in many cases, "obtaining
additional oil [or gas] production., 20 8 In Crawford v. Hrabe, for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the question of
"whether a lessee/oil operator has the right without the les-
sor/landowner's consent to bring off-lease salt water upon the leased
premises for [the] purpose of injecting it into the producing forma-
tion in a secondary recovery project." ,09 The Court concluded that
the operator did have this right and that injecting the water was not
an "enjoinable trespass" 210 because "Crawford's salt water injection
... [was] related to the primary purpose of obtaining additional oil
production;"21 1 the water was being injected to improve the produc-
tivity for the lessor's lease - not other leases; 212 "[t]he secondary
recovery operations .. .increased production," were "beneficial to
all parties;" and the off-lease salt water used for injection was "eco-
nomically available. 213 The Kansas court also relied on other state
cases with holdings that supported its conclusion, citing, for exam-
ple, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manzie1214 for the proposition
that the injection of salt water on one property that migrates to an-
other property is not an enjoinable trespass, provided its purpose is
for secondary recovery. 2 15 Indeed, the Manziel case has strains of
the same deference to state agency decisions in the oil and gas field
as are later reiterated in Coastal Oil. The Court in Manziel con-
cluded,
[I]f, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent waste,
protect correlative rights, or in the exercise of the powers
207. Id. at9, 11, 13.
208. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442,448 (Kan. 2002).
209. Id. at 446.
210. Id. at 453.
211. Id. at 448.
212. Id. at 449.
213. Id. at 453.
214. R.R. Comm. of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
215. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 450 (Kan. 2002) (citing Manziel, 361
S.W.2d at 568).
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within its jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes secon-
dary recovery projects, trespass does not occur when the
injected, secondary recovery forces move across lease
lines, and the operations are not subject to an injunction
on that basis. The technical rules of trespass have no
place in the consideration of the validity of the orders of
the Commission.
216
The Pennsylvania and Texas fracing cases, as well as other cases
addressing similar techniques used to increase oil and gas produc-
tion, have a common theme: the owners of mineral rights or mineral
lessees need to be able to extract the resources that are part of these
rights, including gas or oil that may be difficult to reach. To be able
to do so and to avoid waste, they may need to use relatively intrusive
or unconventional extraction strategies such as those that induce
long fractures into the subsurface property. They are entitled to do
so, although surface owners and adjacent owners may have recourse
in the courts for physical damage, particularly physical damage to
the surface. As the Texas Supreme Court noted in Coastal Oil,
"[h]ad Coastal caused something like proppants to be deposited on
the surface of Share 13, it would be liable for trespass."21  And the
court's language suggests that had Salinas claimed "that the hydrau-
lic fracturing operations damaged his wells or the Vicksburg T for-
mation beneath his property," he might have claimed damages that
were recoverable in a court of law.218 Thus, the case law does not
remove state courts entirely from the regulation of the effects of
fracing. The extent to which courts may be used to challenge physi-
cal damage to property caused by fracing - whether the surface
owner's or adjoining property - remains to be seen. Furthermore,
the Texas court made clear its general distaste for court intervention
into fracing, stating that
briefs from every comer of the industry - regulators,
landowners, royalty owners, operators, and hydraulic
fracturing service providers - all oppose liability for hy-
216. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568-69 (emphasis added).
217. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2008).
218. Id. at 13 ("[Salinas] does not claim that the hydraulic fracturing operation
damaged his wells or the Vicksburg T formation beneath his property. In sum,
Salinas does not claim damages that are recoverable.").
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draulic fracturing, almost always warning of adverse con-
sequences in the direst language. Though hydraulic frac-
turing has been commonplace in the oil and gas industry
for over sixty years, neither the Legislature nor the [Rail-
road] Commission has ever seen fit to regulate it, though
every other aspect of production has been thoroughly
regulated. Into so settled a regime the common law need
not thrust itself.
219
State courts' general deference to state agency decisions, as high-
lighted by Coastal Oil, makes sense from the production perspective
because it avoids overlapping and potentially conflicting sources of
control. If a state commission authorized a method of oil or gas re-
covery, only for a producer to discover that she was liable for tres-
pass in court, it is likely that producers would quickly become frus-
trated and either lobby for change or simply give up and drill else-
where. And courts also reasonably engage in a "balancing of inter-
ests" approach when looking to a given method of oil or gas recov-
ery, weighing the interests of the surface owner in preserving the
surface against those of the producer in wringing as much oil and gas
from the subsurface as is feasible and productive. As the court in
Manziel determined, "Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh
the interests of society and the oil and gas industry as a whole
against the interests of the individual operator who is damaged.,
220
The balancing of interests approach, however, often weighs on the
side of the producer and is not very helpful to plaintiffs claiming
injury. The Texas Supreme Court in Manziel, for example, deter-
mined that "if the authorized activities in an adjoining secondary
recovery unit are found to be based on some substantial, justifying
occasion, then this court should sustain their validity. ' 221 As tradi-
tional oil and gas reserves become less productive and more uncon-
ventional sources are tapped, the interests of producers, consumers,
and states will only add more weight to the resource production side.
As one concurring justice in Coastal Oil concluded, "Amid soaring
demand and sagging supply, Texas common law must accommodate
cutting-edge technologies able to extract untold reserves from un-
conventional fields."
222
219. Id. at 16-17.
220. Manziel, 361 S.W. 2d at 568.
221. Id.
222. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W. 3d at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
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Even if fracing were to be considered to be a trespass-which
might not be the "right" result given state courts' precedential defer-
ence to practices that increase production and avoid waste-it is not
an ideal method to regulate the environmental effects of fracing.
The physical presence of contaminants that leak into nearby forma-
tions or onto the surface might not be discovered for decades, and
the ability of landowners to identify contaminants, particularly those
thousands of feet below the ground, is limited. As such, landowners
would have difficulty identifying causes of action in trespass, aside
from situations where obvious pools of fracing fluids crossed their
boundary line.
Nuisance might be a feasible alternative to trespass, particularly in
places like the Fort Worth region where residents on suburban lots
may be able to prove easily that their lawn used to be green but is
now dead from fracing fluids or other fracing-related surface activi-
ties. 23 Lower courts in Texas, for example, have consistently vali-
dated city and other local oil and gas ordinances that protect human
populations from the nuisances caused by drilling, such as water
supply contamination,224 the prevention of "orderly growth" of a
city,22 5 or "'escaping gas, explosions, fire, cratering, etc."' 226 But
landowner's general difficulties encountered in identifying fracing
contaminants or other effects, which present problems in trespass
cases, also carry over to causation problems in nuisance suits. A
landowner who experiences decreased water pressure or a dried up
well may be unable to prove that a fracing operation caused these
problems. Nuisance suits will likely be insufficient to adequately
address the effects of fracing.
If state courts and the federal government continue to leave most
of the regulation of oil and gas extraction to state agencies, and
given the limitations of common law nuisance and trespass to ad-
dress fracing, the question remains whether state regulation will en-
sure that human health and environmental concerns are adequately
considered as fracing becomes more prevalent.
223. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 54, at 398-402 (discussing nuisance actions
against drilling companies in urban areas and suburbs).
224. Id. at 402 (citing Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 957 S.W.2d
625, 635 (Tex. App. Houston 1997).
225. Id. (quoting Helton v. City of Burkburnett, 619 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1981) (quoting City of Burkburnett, Ordinance No. 375).
226. Id. at 367 (quoting Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 12 F. Supp.
195 (S.D. Tex. 1935)).
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C. State Regulation: Varying Levels of Complexity
Given the lack of federal regulation and the likelihood that state
courts, following Coastal Oil's lead, will be hesitant to interfere with
states' regulation of fracing, state regulation is the central mecha-
nism controlling fracing and its effects. And states do, to some ex-
tent, have programs in place. The Ground Water Protection Council
found that four of the eight "major producing states" had "regulatory
or oversight programs in place specifically for coalbed methane
wells," and the remaining states regulated the wells through their
"general oil and gas production rules." 227 It concluded, as of 1998,
that "[e]xisting state authorities and oversight of this process have
been obviously sufficient to protect [underground drinking water
sources] from contamination" from coalbed methane wells, and that
"[i]f additional federal regulations were to be imposed they would
not be based on scientific observation of associated contamination
and there would be little if any increase in protection of public health
and the environment."2 28 Of course, in the past ten or so years,
much has changed. There are more wells, higher production levels,
and new fracing technologies. Most states continue to regulate frac-
ing as part of the general permitting process for drilling.
Although the Texas Supreme Court observed in Coastal Oil that
Texas has consistently declined to regulate fracing,229 some regula-
tion of fracing in Texas occurs through approval of the drilling per-
mit application as well as more general controls over groundwater
withdrawals and surface disposal. Although these regulations do not
specifically mention fracing, they apply to various components of
the fracing process. Each operator wishing to drill and frac a well in
Texas must submit an application for a permit to drill, deepen, plug
back, or reenter any oil well. 230 Texas does not require an environ-
mental review or assessment of a proposed drilling operation, unlike,
for example, New York and Pennsylvania, but it does require opera-
tors to "obtain and file a 'Water Board Letter' from the Texas Com-
227. Id. at 9.
228. Id. at 10.
229. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 17
(Tex. 2008).
230. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5 (2008).
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mission on Environmental Quality." 231 In a "Surface Casing" Letter,
the operator must submit a "location map" with surveys and a copy
of the well's log (if the driller is re-entering a previously-drilled
well).232 After reviewing the request, the Commission on Environ-
mental Quality may require the operator to obtain a groundwater
protection recommendation letter from the Commission, which
"states the depth to which groundwater must be protected in the well
or other boring. 233 For disposal of drilling wastes, including frac-
ing fluids, operators may only use authorized disposal methods or
.23obtain a disposal permit. 2 Operators are also prohibited from
"caus[ing] or allow[ing] pollution of surface or subsurface water in
the state." 235 An operator may dispose of wastes in a pit only "if
the commission determines that the [disposal] will not result in the..
. the pollution of surface or subsurface waters." 236 For offsite dis-
posal, an operator must use a carrier with a permit to transport
wastes. 237
In Montana, fracing is also regulated through general oil and gas
permitting requirements. Drillers request approval for fracing as part
of an application for a Permit to Drill from Montana's Board of Oil
and Gas Conservation. 2 38  Fracing typically occurs in association
with horizontal drilling. 239 An operator applying for horizontal drill-
ing creates a temporary spacing unit - describing where the wells
will be located - and then after production is established, typically
within 90 days, returns to the Board for approval of permanent spac-
ing.24 ° At this point, if landowners are concerned that operators will
encroach on their mineral rights, they may contest the operator's
231. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Barnett Shale Information (July 30, 2008),
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.html (follow "Is an oil or gas operator
required to perform an environmental study or something similar?" hyperlink).
232. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, Requesting a Surface Casing Letter,
http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/permitting/waste-permits/surface-casing/surf casing.h
tml (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
233. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, Surface Casing to Protect Groundwater:
Am I Regulated?, http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/permitting/waste_permits/surface_
casing/surfcasingAIR.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
234. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(1) (2008).
235. Id. § 3.8(b).
236. Id. § 3.8(d)(6)(A).
237. Id. § 3.8(d)(5).





spacing at a hearing. 241 Once a drilling permit is approved and the
operation is completed, the driller submits a Completion Report. If
the operator fraced as part of the drilling operation, the operator must
report information such as the length of fractures and the pressures
and types of fluids used.242
There is a separate permitting process for operators that frac after
submitting a Completion Report. These operators must submit a
form entitled "Sundry Notices and Report of Wells" to the Board,243
and provide "Notice of Intention to Stimulate or Chemically
Treat.",244 In these forms, the operator must describe the formation
in which the fracing will occur and the fracing process to be fol-
lowed. Provided there are no issues with respect to correlative rights
and the fracing will occur in a single formation, the Board typically
approves the request. Following completion of fracing, the fracing
service company submits a subsequent report on stimulation effects,
including data such as the fracing pressures used and the total
amount of fracing completed.245
Although New York also regulates fracing through its general oil
and gas permitting provisions, 46 these provisions require more spe-
cific measures for environmental protection than do Montana's regu-
lations, and the state has been working to update its Generic Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement to consider the potentially widespread
horizontal drilling of Marcellus Shale units; the results of the update
were slated to be published in a draft scoping document,247 which
would be available for public comment.248 An operator applying to
drill and frac in New York must submit an application for a Permit
to Drill, Deepen, Plug Back or Convert a Well, along with "[a] de-
scription of the proposed drilling program, three copies of a plat, the
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, Sundry Notices and
Report of Wells, available at http://bogc.dnrc.state.mt.us/PDF/Form2.pdf.
244. Id.
245. See Telephone Interview with Steve Sasaki, supra note 9.
246. See Telephone Interview with Ted Loukides, supra note 132.
247. Id.; see also Wilber, supra note 60 (describing how New York is currently
completing a "Comprehensive Environmental Review" of fracing in the Marcellus
Shale).
248. Otsego County Planning Comm'n, available at http://www.otsegocounty.
com/depts/pln/documents/Aug6unansweredquestions_001.pdf (last visited Feb.
25, 2009).
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permit fee, and an Environmental Assessment Form., 249 The permit
application must indicate, inter alia, whether the drilling will be ver-
tical, directional, or horizontal, the "proposed target formation," the
type of well, the drilling fluid to be used, and the type of tools used.
The Environmental Assessment form, which each applicant must
submit along with a drilling permit, requires the applicant to answer
detailed questions regarding "water storage and disposal" and de-
scribe how drilling and stimulation fluids will be contained and dis-
posed of. The applicant must also describe the project and its di-
mensions, and the percentage of the project site that is forest or agri-
cultural land or other vegetated land. 250 The applicant must indicate
the "environmental resources on/near the project site," such as
whether the site is "over a primary or principal aquifer; whether it is
within a certain distance of a public water supply well, surface mu-
nicipal water supply, or "lake, stream, or other public surface water
body"; within an agricultural district; in a flood plain or regulated
wetland; in an area with threatened or endangered animal life; or in a
coastal zone management area or "Critical Environmental Area." 251
Furthermore, the applicant must explain whether topsoil will be dis-
turbed and whether the applicant will implement erosion control
measures as well as whether the applicant will build new access
roads or use existing corridors.252
New York's Department of Environmental Protection reviews
fracing proposals that accompany applications for permits to drill in
New York to ensure that applicants describe the chemical constitu-
ents of fracing fluids and give a "cradle to grave" description of the
acquisition of water for drilling, including methods of acquisition,
location of the water source, and transportation of water onto the
253site.
Similar to other states' general requirements for obtaining drilling
permits, an operator intending to drill or re-enter a well in Colorado
249. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Well Permitting Process: Well Per-
mitting Requirements to Drill, Deepen, Plug Back and Convert for Oil, Gas, Solu-
tion Salt Mining and Other Regulated Wells, available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1772.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
250. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation Div. of Mineral Resources, Envtl.
Assessment Form, Attachment to Drilling Permit Application, No. 85-16-5, avail-
able at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materialsminerals_pdf/eafdril.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2009).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Telephone Interview with Ted Loukides, supra note 132.
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must submit an Application for Permit-to-Drill to the Director of the
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. This application must indi-
cate, among other things, the proposed well location and water wells
and other water sources within 200 to 400 feet of the wellhead.254
The Director may "withhold approval of any Application for Permit-
to-Drill" if the Director "has reasonable cause to believe" that the
proposed well "presents an imminent threat to public health, safety,
and welfare, including the environment., 255 If an operator plans to
commence "subsequent well operations" that will further impact the
surface, including fracing, the operator must submit a Notice of Sub-
sequent Well Operations at least seven days before operations are
anticipated to commence.
256
Operators wanting to perform "enhanced recovery operations"
such as fracing in Colorado must first submit an application for au-
thorization to the Commission. 257 Most of the detailed requirements
for reporting - including the type and amount of fluid as well as a
chemical analysis of the fluid2 8 - apply to underground injection
wells used to enhance recovery, not fracing. But operations that in-
tend to use fracing must include "[a] description of any proposed
stimulation program ' 259 in their application for authorization. Colo-
rado, like Texas and New York, also has regulations for the man-
agement and disposal of oily wastes, one of which includes "frac
sand,, 260 requiring operators to either dispose of the waste at a com-
mercial solid waste disposal facility or through land treatment. If the
operator uses the land treatment option, the free oil must first be re-
moved from the oily waste before treatment, the oily waste "shall be
spread evenly," and "[c]ontamination of ground water or surface
water shall be prevented., 261 The Director may require a more com-
prehensive plan "[w]hen a threatened or significant adverse envi-
ronmental impact from onsite land treatment exists."
262
Due to the recent increase in shale fracing, Colorado has also con-
sidered revising its oil and gas regulations to include more environ-
254. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 303(a)(1), 404-1 (303)(c)(2), (18) (2008).
255. Id. §§ 404-1(303)(k).
256. Id. §§ 404-1(305)(b)(2).
257. Id. § 401(4-1(401)(a).
258. Id. § 404-1(401)(b).
259. Id. § 404-1(401)(b)(4)(F).
260. Id. § 404-1(907)(e).
261. Id. § 404-1(907)(e)(1), (2).
262. Id. § 404-1(307)(e)(2)(F).
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mental protections and allow more landowner participation in deci-
sions on permits to drill; deliberations were slated to be complete by
263the end of September 2008. A staff proposal from September
2008 suggested that the requirements for drilling and recompletion
applications be modified to require an operator, prior to drilling or
commencing subsequent well operations such as fracing, to give no-
tice to "any party that has indicated a desire to receive it," rather than
only to the surface owner of the property being fraced.264 In the No-
tice of Subsequent Well Operations, the proposed modifications
would require an operator to provide:
to the surface owner or agent at least seven (7) days ad-
vance notice of subsequent well operations with heavy
equipment that will materially impact surface areas be-
yond the existing access road or well site, such as recom-
pletion or refracturing of the well, and specifically in-
cluding plugging and abandonment of the well and final
reclamation. 2
65
The modified rules in Colorado, if accepted, will provide relatively
comprehensive regulation of all aspects of fracing, as they address
the underground and surface impacts; they also provide specific op-
portunities for citizens to voice concerns about a proposed fracing
project. New Mexico has implemented similar changes to its oil and
gas rules as fracing in the San Juan basin has become increasingly
common; a new "pit rule" governing disposal of wastes from oil and
gas operations places limitations on chemical constituents sometimes
found in fracing fluids (although not referring to them as such), re-
quiring operators to take special precautions when closing a pit that
is near groundwater. Operators must sample the area for chemicals
like benzene or BTEX - benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes
263. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n State of Colo., In the Matter of
Changes to the Rules and Regulations of the Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n of
the State of Colo., Cause No. IR, Docket No. 0803-RM-02, Rule Language Com-
pilation, 300-Series Rules, at 39, available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/, "Staff Al-
ternative Language for 300 and 900 Series," available at COGCC-300-Series Rule
Language Compilation-090408.pdf.
264. Id. at 39.
265. Id. at 51.
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- and ensure that they do not exceed designated concentration lim-
its.2
66
Like New Mexico and Colorado, Pennsylvania has relatively
strong fracing controls. Although it regulates fracing as part of its
general oil and gas regulations, it mentions fracing extensively in
regulations and best management practices aimed to control the en-
vironmental effects of oil and gas drilling. It also has separate regu-
lations addressing the drilling and fracing of wells in the Marcellus
Shale.
As in other states, any operator wishing to drill for oil or gas in
Pennsylvania must obtain a well permit. 67 The application for a
well permit must indicate, inter alia, the proposed location of the
well, "the name of all surface landowners or water purveyors whose
water supplies are within 1,000 feet of the proposed well location,"
and the workable coal seams underlying the tract. 268 There are spe-
cial spacing requirements for gas wells drilled in coal areas. These
wells must be "not less than 1,000 feet from other such wells," and
330 feet from the tract boundary, although exemptions are permit-
ted.269 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
may deny a permit application if issuing the permit would violate
"any ... applicable environmental statute, rule or regulation." 270 If
the surface owner is not the same entity as the operator, the surface
owner may file objections if the owner believes that the proposed
well location violates the rules or that the application has incorrect
information. 27 A landowner or purveyor of water who experiences
problems with water quality or quantity after drilling may request the
Department to conduct an investigation, and the Department must
determine within 45 days whether the drilling caused the pollution.
If there is a causal connection, or if the Department presumes that
the well operator is responsible, the Department orders the operator
to restore or replace the water supply. 2 7  The Department presumes
that well operators are responsible for water pollution occurring
within six months after drilling or completion of a well that is within
266. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.13 (Weil 2008).
267. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., supra note 17, at ch. 3 p. 1.
268. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.201(a)(2)(b)(West 2008).
269. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., supra note 18, at ch. 3 p. 3.
270. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.201 (a)(2)(e)(1).
271. Id. at § 202(a).
272. Id. at §§ 202(a), 208(b).
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1,000 feet of a water well, unless the well operator provides an af-
firmative defense.
273
Pennsylvania also has specific requirements for the disposal of
waste and wastewater from drilling and fracing, requiring a control
and disposal plan for fluids, including "stimulation fluids" (those
used in fracing), 74 Its regulations on "activities utilizing pollutants"
are similarly stringent, requiring that operators submit "a report or
plan for activities" and stating that "[t]he Department will encourage
the use of pollution prevention measures that minimize or eliminate
the generation of the pollutant," including "reuse, recycling, treat-
ment and disposal., 2
75
To satisfy Pennsylvania's requirement for a plan for the disposal of
fluids from drilling (and fracing), an operator completes and imple-
ments a "Preparedness, Prevention and Contingency (PPC) Plan for
Oil and Gas Development. 2 76 In the plan, the operator must list the
chemicals in the fracing fluids, including data on their toxicity, and
describe the wastes generated and methods for clean-up, disposal, or
reuse of waste. 277 The operator must also designate a representative
to report pollution incidents.2 78 The management practices encour-
age operators to use "[e]fficient [f]rac [f]luids" such as foam frac
and "[a] polymeric material., 279 Further, the management practices
attempt to reduce surface impacts of drilling and fracing, encourag-
ing, for example, "unloading pad[s]" to prevent vehicles from carry-
ing mud from the drilling site onto public roads280 and asking opera-
tors to identify all water sources that could be affected by activities
on the surface or subsurface before preparing the site or drilling.
281
Finally, Pennsylvania's management practices provide guidance on
treating and discharging waste fluids, explaining that some fracing
fluids can be treated and discharged on the surface of the site but that
this method typically requires the operator to acquire a National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination permit (a Clean Water Act require-
ment) and a permit under Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law. 28
273. Id. at § 208(c).
274. 25 PA. CODE § 78.55 (2008).
275. 25 PA. CODE § 91.34 (2008).
276. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., supra note 18, at ch. 4 p. 2.
277. Id. at 3.
278. Id. at 3-4.
279. Id. at 7-8.
280. Id. at 45.
281. Id. at 73.
282. Id. at 80.
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Operators planning to drill for oil and gas in the Marcellus Shale
formation in Pennsylvania must also submit special water manage-
ment plans and specific descriptions of the well site. Like other oil
and gas drillers, they must "develop and implement" a Preparedness,
Prevention and Contingency (PPC) Plan including "a description of
the operation, pollution prevention measures, chemicals or additives
used and waste generated, waste dispos&l methods, incident response
plans and corrective action plans, and an implementation sched-
ule. 283 This evaluation must show the water uses on the site prior
to fracing and/or drilling and that the operator will protect the water
quality necessary for those uses and will not "cause pollution." Fur-
ther, the applicant must "[p]rovide chemical analysis of the fracing
fluids to be added to the raw water," a "sampling and analyzing plan
for all fluids (associated with fracing) that are used, re-
used/recovered, processed/treated, stored and disposed," and de-
scribe how the fluids and wastewater will be managed onsite or at
the treatment facilities to which they will be sent.284
Alabama, a state where fracing primarily occurs in coalbeds, has a
long experience with fracing regulation. It is the only state to have
regulated fracing through its Underground Injection Control pro-
gram, although it now joins other states in regulating through the
general permitting process. 285  Following the LEAF case, fracing
was regulated as "an injection well which is used . . . for enhanced
recovery of oil or natural gas" under the definition of Class II injec-
tion wells in Alabama's underground injection well regulations.286
An applicant for a Class II well injection was required to follow a
two-step process. The first step was the application for drilling,
conversion, or reentry of a plugged and abandoned well for injection
purposes; the application required, among other things, a description
of the procedures for the proposed injection, the "estimated location
of the base of the deepest" underground source of drinking water, a
description of where the fracing fluids would come from and what
they would consist of, the estimated pressure for injection the fluids,
the amounts of fluids to be used daily, and proof that the operator
283. Pa. Dep't of Envt'l Prot., Application Addendum and Instructions for Mar-
cellus Shale Gas Well Dev., Form 5500-PM-OG0083 (2008) (on file with author).
284. Id. at 3.
285. See infra note 288.
286.- See Rule 400-4-2-01(l)(a), (d), available at http://www.ogb.state.al.us/
ogb/rules.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) ("Injection shall mean the introduction
of fluids into a subsurface stratum or formation.").
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has notified the public of the proposed fracing. The second step,
involving the "Application for Permit to Inject Fluids," required,
among other things, a well bore sketch showing the depth of the in-
jection formation and again, the "base of the deepest" underground
source of drinking water, an affidavit and statement "specifying the
source of injected fluids," and proof that the well would be protected
with casing such that the "irjected fluids cannot migrate" to the un-
287derground drinking water source. Like Pennsylvania, this regula-
tory system covered a range of the effects of fracing, from the use of
toxic fluids to concerns about the source of the fluid and the poten-
tial migration of contaminants to nearby formations. In 2007, how-
ever, Alabama's Oil and Gas Board voted to "exclude hydraulic
fracturing from the regulatory requirements of the Class II Under-
ground Injection Control Program. 288
Like most other states with fracing operations, Alabama now regu-
lates fracing activities through the oil and gas permitting process,
although it has additional requirements to control the effects of frac-
ing. Operators proposing to fracture a coalbed must submit a $175
check with their proposal to fracture, and special approval from the
Oil and Gas Board Supervisor is required before fracing commences.
The Operators must provide the Supervisor with a document describ-
ing the name of the coalbed and the depth of proposed fracing, main-
tain "an inventory of fresh water supply wells within a one quarter..
. mile radius" of the fraced well, and must "affirm to the Supervisor,
in writing," that the "inventory of fresh water supply wells have [sic]
been evaluated and that the results of this evaluation indicate that the
proposed hydraulic fracturing operations can be conducted without
adverse impact on any fresh water supply wells or any fresh water
resources."289 The operator must also describe the likely maximum
length and direction of the fractures, and detail which types of fluids
and other materials will be used in the fracing operation. 290 The use
of diesel fuel as a fracing fluid is prohibited. Finally, operators must
287. Id. at 400-4-2-01(3)(a); 400-4-2-01(3)(b).
288. Ala. Oil and Gas Board, In re: Order No. 2007-133 (Sept. 7, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.gsa.state.al.us/ogb/ogb.html (follow "Hearings" hyperlink; then
follow "Orders" hyperlink; select the year "2007" from the drop-down menu; go
to page 7 of the Board Order File Name; follow the "Order No. 2007-133" hyper-
link) (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
289. State Oil and Gas Board Admin. Code, § 400-3-8-03, available at
http://www.gsa.state.al.us/ogb/rules.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
290. Id.
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maintain "all records associated with each [fracing] proposal" for at
least three years following the completion of fracing.
This sampling of state regulations shows the wide range of fracing
controls that exist today. Some states have only basic regulations
that address fracing indirectly, while others have comprehensive re-
quirements covering nearly every step of the fracing process. Most
states are, at minimum, collecting data on the fracing fluids used and
the formation that has been fractured. A few address groundwater
withdrawal and disposal concerns specific to fracing. And still
fewer allow public participation in the decision to grant a permit to
drill and frac, beyond complaints of traditional neighboring land-
owner concerns such as drainage of the oil and gas beneath their
property. Few states have banned the use of hazardous fracing flu-
ids, and few have specifically addressed the concerns that arise
where fractures extend further than anticipated and enable fracturing
fluids to flow into neighboring formations. The following Part dis-
cusses the implications of this regulatory structure, urging that both
states and the federal government should revisit their regulations
after obtaining better scientific data on the range of the potential and
observed effects of fracing.
V. REGULATORY PROBLEMS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
The varying complexity and breadth of state oil and gas regula-
tions suggests that some states are not adequately protecting under-
ground sources of drinking water - sources that are of federal con-
cern - from the impacts of fracing. It is true that many fracing fluids
are benign;292 but others like benzene or formaldehyde can be toxic
at certain concentrations2 93 and are currently not directly regulated at
the federal or state level in the context of fracing. The EPA con-
cluded in its 2004 report that "evidence suggests that coalbeds in 10
of the 11 major coal basins in the United States are located at least
partially within" underground sources of drinking water.294  And
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., EPA 2004, supra note 7.
293. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 12, at 2 ("Coal bed hydraulic fracturing...
may introduce toxic materials such as acids, benzene toluene, ethyl benzene, xy-
lene, formaldehyde, polyacrylamides, chromates, and other toxic components into
underground sources of drinking water.").
294. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 7-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/
OGWDW/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy attach uic chO7_conclusions.pdf.
2009]
168 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
fracing activity in recent years has rapidly expanded in several shale
formations throughout the United States. Yet in a report questioned
by members of Congress and an EPA whistleblower, 295 the EPA
determined that further research, was unnecessary,29 6 and fracing
was ultimately exempted from federal regulation.
29
A. Federal Regulatory Failures
Despite the EPA's and several environmental and national non-
profit groups' having conducted preliminary studies of the effects of
fracing, the full range of effects remains largely untested. As such,
we cannot yet know the extent of the regulatory failure, unlike a pol-
lutant like MTBE, for which the gravity of regulatory problems is
now widely recognized.298 It is possible, however, to identify sev-
eral problems that foreshadow potentially grave concerns for the
future with respect to the effects of fracing. This is best accom-
plished by looking to the broader environmental literature on regula-
tory failures.
A useful reference point is MTBE, which is perhaps the quintes-
sential case study for regulatory decisions gone awry. Tom
McGarity provides a thorough analysis of these failures in his article,
MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, describing the several "critical
points" at which EPA or Congress could have avoided the regulatory
pitfalls that occurred for this groundwater contaminant. 299 Given the
potential effects of MTBE and its presence in drinking water sources
throughout the United States, its continued contamination of these300
sources raises regulatory flags. McGarity discusses two critical
steps in the MTBE regulatory process that may be relevant to frac-
ing. The first was the omission of MTBE from federal emissions
regulation. In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to pro-
hibit the marketing of fuel used in vehicles with catalytic converters
if the fuel was dissimilar to the fuels used in emissions certification
of vehicles. But the EPA was allowed to waive this requirement if
295. See supra note 106.
296. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 3.
298. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV.
ENVTL L. REv. 281, 282 (2004) (hereinafter MTBE) (discussing the modem envi-
ronmental regulatory regime and how MTBE "represents one of its most striking
failures").
299. Id.
300. See id. at 293-94.
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301the fuel was unlikely to damage catalytic converters, and was re-
quired to do so unless it commenced its own rulemaking to deter-
mine that the additive might "reasonably be anticipated to endanger
the public health or welfare" or that it damaged an emissions reduc-
tion system. 30 2  In granting the MTBE waiver, the EPA failed to
consider MTBE's potential environmental and health effects, as it
was not directed to by Congress.303 The second problem was inade-
quate toxicity testing of MTBE under the Toxic Substances Control
Act ("TSCA"). Although the EPA had the authority under TSCA to
require the manufacturer of a chemical substance like MTBE to con-
duct specific environmental and toxicity testing, industry, after con-
ducting extensive tests of its own, "launched a major effort" to avoid
time-consuming testing requirements imposed by the EPA.304 The
EPA entered into a consent order with the major oil companies that
used MTBE, wherein the companies agreed to conduct some tests on
toxicity and human health, but there were no provisions for envi-
ronmental testing.
305
Somewhat similar to the course of the MTBE decision-making
process, both Congress and the EPA have made several significant
and potentially harmful decisions in the regulation of fracing. Just as
industry obtained a waiver from federal regulation for MTBE, Con-
gress exempted fracing, with the exception of fracing with diesel
fuel, from the Safe Drinking Water Act.306 And just as the toxicity
data on MTBE remains woefully inadequate, information on the en-
vironmental and health effects of the substances used in fracing is
limited to the EPA study and several smaller reports or white papers
301. Id. at 296-97 (citing 42 USC § 7545 (f)(4) (allowing the Administrator to
waive the prohibition of the marketing of fuel used in vehicles with catalytic con-
verters if the fuel was dissimilar to the fuels used in emissions certification of
vehicles "if he determines that the applicant has established that such fuel or fuel
additive or a specified concentration thereof, and the emission products of such
fuel or fuel additive or specified concentration thereof, will not cause or contribute
to a failure of any emission control device or system"').
302. Id. at 297; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (c) (providing that "[n]o fuel or fuel
additive . .. [could] be prohibited by the Administrator" unless he conducted a
thorough scientific and economic study and made formal findings).
303. McGarity, MTBE, supra note 298, at 297 ("Because the waiver was man-
datory for any new fuel that did not interfere with pollution control devices, the
agency did not consider any possible adverse effects on air or groundwater quality
when it granted the waiver.").
304. Id. at 299.
305. Id. at 301.
306. See supra note 3.
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by government agencies and environmental and industry-based in-
terest groups. 30 7 None of these provide adequate scientific data on
the effects of fracing.
1. Insufficient or "Bent" Science
The theory of "unsound science" as a regulatory failure posits that
agencies writing regulations rely on science of questionable qual-
ity.3° 8 Often an attack launched by industry,30 9 individuals and
groups arguing for "sound science" claim that an agency has "failed
to consult with outside experts" or "made biased interpretations of
scientific evidence," 310 or that further testing of a product or prac-
tice's danger would be flawed and would not generate useful re-
sults. 311 It is not only a one-sided criticism, however: "Nearly eve-
ryone believes that society is better off when governmental interven-
tions ... are driven by sound science, rather than unfounded emo-
tions. 3
12
But sound science is itself a politically-charged critique and does
not fully explain the problems with fracing regulation. McGarity,
for example, does not attribute the problems with MTBE regulation
to unsound science, apart from a lack of "decision-making informed
by a complete set of relevant toxicological and environmental fate
data., 313 Any lack of sound science, he argues, was due to industry's
resistance to providing EPA with additional testing results on toxic-
307. See generally supra, Part II.
308. See, e.g., McGarity, MTBE, supra note 298, at 317-18.
309. See, Patrick A. Fuller, How Peer Review of Agency Science can Help
Rulemaking: Enhancing Judicial Deference at the Frontiers of Knowledge, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 931, 935 (2007) (discussing how "[p]art of the industry re-
sponse to... [the government's] new focus on public health and environmental
regulation was to criticize agencies' use of science in regulatory decisions" and
how "avoidance of responsibility (and liability) by questioning the validity of data
is a classic tactic of industries whose products may be causing harm").
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Sci-
ence is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and
Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv.
897, 897-98 (2004) (discussing FDA Commissioner Veneman's dismissal of "con-
sumer group demands for more testing [of cattle for mad cow disease] on the
ground that additional testing would not be based on 'sound science").
312. Id. at 898.
313. McGarity, MTBE, supra note 298, at 320.
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ity, not EPA's failures.314 Similarly, in the context of fracing, indus-
try has resisted further scientific testing.315 Aside from those prob-
lems, the failures of EPA's fracing conclusions result from a lack of
science, not "unsound" science. Although the EPA consulted with
outside experts-many from industry-its study was not designed to
be scientifically rigorous. Rather, it aimed to "review hydraulic frac-
turing processes, practices and settings"; "identify incidents that had
not been reported to the EPA"; and "review... reported incidents of
groundwater contamination and any follow-up actions or investiga-
tions by other parties. ' 316 Nowhere in its description of the report
did the EPA suggest that it would conduct scientific analysis of toxi-
cological data or toxicity pathways in human.
In a critique distinct from the question of sound science, Wendy
Wagner and Tom McGarity have more recently observed the prob-
lem of entities' "bending" of science: "where research is manipu-
lated to advance economic or ideological ends." 317 The bending of
science occurs through many paths. In the governmental context,
agencies can convene federal science advisory panels that "might
satisfy legal requirements [under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act] but are nevertheless badly imbalanced and therefore likely to
reach a predetermined outcome, 318 for example. Weston Wilson,
an EPA whistleblower, argued that this sort of scientific "packag-
ing' 319 occurred in the preparation of EPA's fracing report, urging
that "EPA decisions were supported by a Peer Review Panel; how-
ever, five of the seven members of this panel appear to have con-
flicts-of-interest and may benefit from EPA's decision not to con-
duct further investigation or impose regulatory conditions., 320 Spe-
cifically, he identified three industry experts - a "petroleum engineer
with BP Amoco, .... a technical advisor for Halliburton Energy Ser-
vices, Inc.," and "an engineer with the Gas Technology Institute."
321
Two other members were an assistant professor and a Colorado Oil
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text.
316. EPA, supra note 7, at 2-1 to 2-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw0/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch02_methodology.pdf.
317. THOMAS MCGARITY AND WENDY WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH I (Harvard Univ. Press
2008).
318. Id. at 183.
319. Id.
320. Wilson, supra note 12.
321. Id. at 14.
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and Gas Conservation Committee member who were formerly BP
Amoco and Mobil Exploration employees: Weston argued that these
members had "an appearance of potential conflict of interest."
322
Furthermore, Weston urged that the EPA failed to include on the
Peer Review Panel EPA professionals knowledgeable in specific
industry fracing practices in each basin, "human and animal toxico-
logical effects," or "groundwater flow . . .regarding the fate and
transport of ... [fracing] fluids in. .. specific underground condi-
tions. ' '0
2 3
Although the EPA's scientific peer-review panel may have "been
fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the
functions to be performed," 324 as it contained members from at least
three different areas (industry, academia, and lab research), "bal-
ance" would ideally require more than representation of individuals
from various professions. More information on the EPA's proce-
dures for appointing the board would be helpful, such as a general
discussion of whether and how the EPA determined that individual
members did not have financial or other conflicts of interest and
whether the EPA followed up on any financial disclosures from
panel participants that raised potential conflict-of-interest con-
cerns. The GAO, for example, has in the past faulted the EPA for
failing to evaluate disclosures on a peer review panel for 1,3-
Butadiene, wherein several panelists "identified completed or ongo-
ing research studies on the chemical that they had conducted," some
of which had been supported by chemical company-sponsored or-
ganizations, and another panelist "reported a prior long-term affilia-
tion with a chemical industry organization that had commented to
EPA on its revised guidelines. ' ' 326 The GAO concluded that "while
the above disclosures may not represent activities or affiliations that
would necessarily preclude any of these individuals from participat-
322. Id.; see also EPA, Underground Injection Control Program, Peer Review
Panel for the Coalbed Methane Study, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw000/uic/wells_coalbedmethanestudy_peerreview.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2009) (listing the peer review panelists and providing brief biographies).
323. Id.
324. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (2000); see also
Joe G. Conley, Note: Conflict of Interest and the EPA 's Science Advisory Board,
86 TEx. L. REv. 165, 168 (2007) (discussing the Act).
325. See, e.g., GAO, EPA's SCIENCE ADvISORY BOARD PANELS: IMPROVED
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NEEDED TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE
(June 2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01536.pdf.
326. Id. at 13.
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ing on the peer review panel, they do represent information that
should be evaluated by the staff's office before finalizing its selec-
tion of panelists." 327  Since the GAO's report, the Scientific Advi-
sory Board has reformed appointment procedures, requiring, for ex-
ample, new conflict-of-interest forms eliciting more disclosure, as
well as investigation of a panelist's appearance of partiality. 328 But
these reforms may not be enough, as the process still assumes that
"institutionally driven viewpoints" are "facially irrelevant" to the
question of balance and thus fails to "gather relevant information on
the real or apparent biases of panelists.,
329
In sum, with respect to panel composition for the EPA's report on
fracing, there is no information suggesting that the panel was in fact
biased, although the industry affiliations create strong appearances
of non-impartiality: the EPA relied on data from Halliburton, Inc.
and the Gas Technology Institute in its report 330 and also included
employees of these companies on its peer review panel. Of graver
concern, however, is another method of "bending" that may have
occurred in preparing the report: the "hiding" of science, which oc-
curs when an individual or organization omits data or analysis from
a report or presentation. 331  McGarity and Wagner, for example,
point to a National Marine Fisheries Service report, wherein a scien-
tific panel suggested a particular distinction in endangered species
designation (separating wild salmon from hatchery salmon), which
the panel deleted from its final report in 2000.33 2 Similarly, they
discuss an incident wherein the FDA prevented a staff scientist from
presenting a meta-analysis with important results to an FDA advi-
sory committee. 333 A group of Representatives expressed concern
that similar data-hiding may have occurred in the midst of the EPA's
327. Id. at 14.
328. Conley, supra note 324, at 176-179 (discussing the Scientific Advisory
Board reforms).
329. Id. at 187, 186.
330. See EPA 2004, supra note 7, at MR-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdwOO0/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic references.pdf (citing the Gas Technol-
ogy Institute Web site and Halliburton, Inc. site visits and personal communica-
tions).
331. McGarity and Wagner, supra note 317, at 97, 123.
332. McGarity and Wagner, supra note 317, at 125-26.
333. Id. at 126 (discussing how the meta-analysis suppressed by senior FDA
officials "showed that children given. . . [antidepressant drugs] were almost twice
as likely to become suicidal as children on placebos").
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fracing research. A letter from Henry Waxman in October 2002
stated:
Two weeks ago, congressional staff working on the en-
ergy conference met with EPA officials to discuss the
risks posed by hydraulic fracturing to drinking water
sources. The congressional staff were seeking informa-
tion about whether the energy bill should contain a provi-
sion that would potentially exempt hydraulic fracturing
from EPA regulation. At that meeting, congressional
staff.., pointed out that data from an August 2002 report
by EPA on hydraulic fracturing showed that hydraulic
fracturing could result in benzene and other toxic chemi-
cals in underground source of drinking water at levels
that exceeded federal drinking water standards...... A
week later, however, EPA provided congressional staff
with a new analysis, using changed numbers. This new
analysis showed that hydraulic fracturing would not pro-
duce benzene levels in drinking water sources that were
above the federal standards. The explanation of these
sudden changes was that they were 'based on feedback'
from unidentified industry sources.
334
The EPA responded, stating that there "was no alteration of data"
and that "in preparing the September 20/23 Supplemental Material,
there was no discussion by Agency staff with industry sources or
others." 335 Representative Waxman wrote another letter, however,
urging that "[b]oth of these assertions are contradicted by the docu-
ment dated September 18, 2002 that EPA staff gave to my staff.
3 3 6
He reproduced tables from that document, showing benzene levels at
the edge of a fracture zone at concentrations higher than the federal
standard, and a revised table from a later report showing lower con-
334. Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Administrator Christine
Todd Whitman (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20040827104747-13515.pdf.
335. Letter from Administrator Christine Todd Whitman to Representative
Henry Waxman (Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20040827104826-35062.pdf.
336. Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Christine Todd Whitman




centrations, with an explanation that "EPA confirmed the volumes
and calculations used to estimated point-of-injection and edge of
fracture zone concentrations with industry sources. Based on that
feedback, we changed the point-of-injection concentration to more
accurately reflect the actual density of the gel-water mixture. 337
Waxman's letter also responded to the EPA's argument that his
complaint "'seriously undermines attempts to base environmental
decisions on sound science."' 338 He explained that "'[i]n fact, the
whole purpose of my letter was to understand whether the basis of
the 'changed' data in the September 18 document was good science
or the political influence of companies ... that benefit from the re-
vised data. Your insistent denials that EPA did anything improper
do not answer the important questions raised by my letter."
339
In addition to potentially "bending" science, many portions of the
report are simply not "scientific" and are instead based in general-
ized conclusions. In discounting the effects of toxic substances used
in fracing in its final report, for example, the report concedes that
"some of the fluids and fluid additives" used in fracing "may contain
constituents of potential concern." 340 It then lists in table form "ex-
amples of chemicals found in hydraulic fracturing fluids according
to [material safety data sheets] ...provided by [fracing] service
companies, and potential human health effects associated with the
product., 341 These are of course only examples, and the report fails
to provide a comprehensive analysis of potentially harmful compo-
nents of fracing fluids. The report includes fifteen products of poten-
tial concern, 342 whereas one health analyst has testified that there are
at least 171 products and 245 chemicals within those products used
for natural gas development. 343 Although her testimony focused on
fracing, this analyst did not specify, however, whether these products
and chemicals were components of fracing fluids or gas production




340. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 4-3, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch4_hydfrac_ fluids.pdf.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 4-9-4-10.
343. Testimony of Theo Colborn, Ph.D., Environmental Health Analyst, before
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Second, and more importantly, the EPA's report is too general to
provide adequate data on risk. It emphasizes, for example, that "[i]t
is important to note that information presented in... [material safety
data sheets] is for pure product. Each of the products listed in...
[the table of constituents of potential concern] is significantly diluted
prior to injection., 345 In the descriptive text preceding the table, the
report relies upon industry data, BLM reports, and three site visits to
346identify the typical dilutions of each constituent. But this does not
explain how each fracing product, as diluted or mixed with under-
ground water or environmental media, will act. Nor does it explain
the quantities of the constituents of various fracing products that are
likely to remain following recovery of fracing fluid from the ground:
for fluids that do not mix well with water, substantial amounts may
remain underground, as mentioned elsewhere in the EPA's report.
Although the report discusses quantitative estimates for recovery in
general,348 it does not specify fluid types, and it recognizes that there
are factors likely to reduce the effectiveness of recovery. 349 All of
these details may have been too specific for an EPA "Phase I study,"
wherein the objective was to "assess the potential for contamination
of. . . [underground sources of drinking water] due to the injection
of hydraulic fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells and to de-
termine, based on these findings, whether further study is war-
ranted. 3 50 As Administrator Whitman emphasized in a letter, "[t]he
Study was not designed, nor does it claim to be, a detailed, site-
specific risk assessment of all potential locations for coalbed meth-
345. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 4-3, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewa-
ter/ uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uicch4_hydfracfluids.pdf.
346. Id. at 4-4.
347. See id. at 4-15 (discussing a report by Palmer, which found that "61 per-
cent of fracturing fluids were recovered based on samples collected from coalbed
methane wells over a 19-day period" and by Steidl, which discussed "gel clumps"
within many fractures (citing P.F. Steidl, Inspection of Induced Fractures Inter-
cepted by Mining in the Warrior Basin, Alabama, 1991 Proc. Coalbed Methane
Symp. 181-191; I.D. Palmer & R.T. Fryar, et al., COMPARISON BETWEEN GEL-
FRACTURE AND WATER-FRACTURE STIMULATIONS IN THE BLACK WARRIOR BASIN,
1991 Proc. Coalbed Methane Symp. 233-242); see also id. at 3-11-3-14, available
at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOO/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach-uic-chO3_cbm_
practices.pdf (discussing studies on fluid recovery).
348. Id. at 3-11-3-14.
349. Id. at 3-12-3-13.




ane hydraulic fracturing. '351 But after recognizing the "potential
concern" of several human health effects related to fracing fluid con-
stituents, including potential "[c]hronic effects/[c]arcinogenicity,"
death after ingestion, "eye, skin, respiratory irritation," "liver and
kidney effects," "heritable genetic damage in humans," "tissue dam-
age, .... discomfort, pain, coughing, dermatitis," "permanent eye dam-
age," "eye, blood, liver, kidney, heart, central nervous system and
spleen damage," 352 and other effects, the report, instead of suggest-
ing that more specific scientific data would elucidate these concerns,
determined that no additional study was needed.353 The report con-
cluded that none of the chemicals of potential concern, aside from
diesel fuel, were on the Contaminant Candidate List to be evaluated
by EPA's drinking water program. Two of the potential constituents
of concern listed in the EPA's fracing report, including ethylene gly-
col and methanol, are now on the candidate list. 
354
The EPA further stated, in concluding that chemicals other than
diesel were not of major concern,
EPA does not believe that the other ... constituents po-
tentially contained in fracturing fluids are introduced
through coalbed methane fracturing in concentrations
high enough to pose a significant threat to . . . [under-
ground sources of drinking water]. First, it is EPA's un-
derstanding, based on conversations with field engineers
and on witnessing three separate fracturing events, that
fracturing fluids used for coalbed methane fracturing do
not contain most of the constituents listed [in the table of
constituents of potential concern." Second, if the . . .
constituents were used, EPA believes some of the same
hydrodynamic phenomena listed in steps 2 and 4 (flow-
back and dispersion), step 3 (adsorption and entrapment),
and potentially step 5 (biodegradation) would minimize
351. Whitman, supra note 335.
352. EPA, supra note 7, at 4-9-4-10, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewa-
ter/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy attach-uic-ch04_hyd-frac-fluids.pdf.
353. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
354. Id. at 4-9 to 4-10 (listing methanol and ethylene glycol as "[c]hemicals
[flound in [h]ydraulic [f]racturing [f]luids"); EPA, Drinking Water Contaminant
Candidate List and Regulatory Determinations, Contaminant Candidate List 3
(hereinafter CCL 3), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ccl/
ccl3.html#chemical (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
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the possibility that chemicals included in the fracturing
fluids would adversely affect... [underground sources of
drinking water]. 355
This is not a scientific result. First, the EPA's conclusions, as in-
dicated by its language, are often based on limited "beliefs" and as-
sumptions and on small samples - three field visits, references to
BLM studies, and "conversations" with industry, 356 for example.
The "steps" to which the EPA refers as mitigating contamination in
the context of diesel constituents include general conclusions such as
"dilution may significantly reduce ...concentrations available to
drinking water wells, especially when they are great distances from
the hydraulic fracture" and "entrapment of gel may reduce the avail-
ability.., of [the contaminant] to the surrounding groundwater. '" 357
While these generalized "steps" are based on discussions of litera-
ture reviewed and industry data,358 many of the discussions lack cita-
tions. The report states, "Dilution can have a significant effect on
the . . . [chemical constituent] concentrations that could migrate to
drinking water wells, especially if those wells are hundreds to thou-
sands of feet from a hydraulically induced fracture," but provides no
citation, aside from later referencing a source that defines "hydrody-
namic dispersion." 359 It also provides no citation for its conclusion
that "[a]s groundwater flows through a formation, chemicals such as
... [diesel constituents] may be retarded by adsorption."36  Its dis-
cussion of adsorption in its chapter on the "Characteristics of Coal-
bed Methane Production" is similarly general and in that context,
describes adsorption as a barrier to recovery of fracing fluids, sug-
gesting that although adsorption could potentially retard the flow of
fracing fluids into groundwater (a proposition unsupported by cita-
355. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 4-17, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewa-
ter/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch04_hydfrac-fluids.pdf.
356. Id. (discussing EPA's understanding of fracing fluids based on "conserva-
tions with field engineers").
357. Id. at 4-18.
358. Data from Halliburton and Schlumberger and a site visit to Virginia, for
example, indicated that dilution for slurried diesel and gel "is approximately 4 to
10 gallons of concentrated liquid gel (guar slurried in diesel) per 1,000 gallons of
make-up water." Id. at 4-4.
359. Specific citations to dilution relate only to brief discussion of dilution of
chemicals within the fracing fluid itself (discussions of concentrations of diesel
slurry and microbiocides in fracing water). See id. at 4-4, 4-7.
360. Id. at 4-17.
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tions), it could also prevent the recovery of fracing fluids from the
ground. 361 This alternate discussion of adsorption also recognizes
that "adsorption to other surrounding geologic material (e.g., shale,
sandstone) is likely to be minimal. 362 Furthermore, the report con-
cedes at times that specific information was not available for the
mitigating effects to which it cited. With respect to the degradation
of diesel in groundwater, for example, the report explains that "[n]o
information was found about the occurrence of biodegradation or
biodegradation rates of ... [diesel constituents] in coalbeds or sur-
rounding rock., 363  In discussing adsorption of contaminants in
coalbeds and dilution of chemicals after injection and prior to their
migration to wells, the report recognizes that "quantification of ad-
sorption is difficult in the absence of laboratory or site-specific stud-
ies'364 and that
EPA does not provide estimates of concentrations beyond
the point-of-injection in the final report. Developing
such concentration values with the precision to compare
them to... [maximum contaminant levels] would require
the collection of significant amounts of site-specific data.
This data in turn would be used to perform a formal risk
assessment, considering numerous fate and transport sce-
narios. These activities are beyond the scope of this
Phase I study. 365
In sum, the EPA report is not a rigorous scientific analysis of the
specific impacts of fracing on human health or the environment -
whether "bent" or not. As such, it provides inadequate data and
analysis to determine potential impacts on human health and specifi-
cally, whether the risks are sufficiently low to merit exemption from
the Safe Drinking Water Act.
361. Id. at 3-14, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOO/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudyattach-uic-ch03_cbm_practices.pdf (Stating, without citation, that
"[a]sorption and chemical reactions can prevent the fluid from being recovered").
362. Id.
363. Id. at 4-16, available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_
attach uic ch04_,hyd_fracfluids.pdf.
364. Id. at 4-17.
365. Id. at 4-12.
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2. Agency Capture
The EPA's conclusion that further study of fracing's effects may
also have been the result of agency capture-another type of regula-
tory failure. The theory of agency capture observes that agencies are
likely to be influenced by interested industry players, which often
lobby and provide data to the agencies that write regulations and
influence statutes. 366 Individuals, environmental non-profits, state
regulators, and industry stakeholders all made their views heard prior
to the EPA's final report and Congress' exemption of fracing from
the Safe Drinking Water Act. But industry and state regulators, who
have a stated intent of advocating for "environmentally-sound ways
to increase the supply of American energy" 367 and "states' rights to
govern petroleum resources within their borders" 368 may have had
the upper hand. In 2000, 35 industry associations opposed EPA's
study, urging,
The sheer magnitude of fracturing jobs is indicative that
no environmental problem exists that is not already con-
trolled under existing state programs. In fact, this judge-
ment [sic] was clearly verified by a study done by the
Ground Water Protection Council at EPA's request....
But now, because "EPA has received verbal and written
reports from several environmental interest groups that
practices associated with methane gas production from
coal beds has resulted in contamination of their under-
ground drinking water sources," EPA is choosing to ig-
nore this ponderous body of evidence to initiate its study.
There is no clear justification why "several" reports can
trigger a study of the magnitude EPA is proposing. Based
on the study design, it will take EPA roughly 18 months
to determine whether these "reports" are so compelling
that they offset a history of over a million hydraulic frac-
366. McGarity, MTBE, supra note 298, at 325-26; see also RANDALL
BARTLETT, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER 155 (Springer Nether-
lands 1973) (discussing public choice theory, which suggests that industry groups
- the groups likely to suffer the greatest losses or reap the greatest benefits - have
a strong interest in influencing policy).
367. Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (hereinafter IOGCC), About
Us, available at http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/about-us (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
368. IOGCC, What We Do, available at http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/what-we-
do (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
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turing jobs and the Ground Water Protection Council
analysis.... EPA has used the Court decision [LEAF] to
generate this overly broad and obtuse study.369
In 2001, Halliburton allegedly asked EPA to complete its slated in-
vestigation of hydrofracturing in time for a "Cabinet-level gathering"
on energy issues, but the EPA "balked" at preparing a report in such
a short time frame. 370 Following the completion of the report, indus-
try vigorously used its results to lobby Congress. In October 2003,
for example, the American Exploration and Production Council
urged,
In view of the 2002 EPA study findings, in the 108'h Con-
gress the House of Representatives adopted a straight-
forward provision to prevent hydraulic fracturing from
being regulated under the EPA .. .[underground injec-
tion control] program .... Now, the 108th Congress can
and should move quickly to pass the House's simplified
legislation included in recent comprehensive energy bill
Conference Committee drafts.37'
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, a group of state
regulators, called the legislation its own, stating, "President Bush
signed into law the new energy bill this summer, which includes the
IOGCC's proposal to resolve the hydraulic fracturing issue and
brings several years of hard work by the Commission to fruition." 372
While the extent to which industry pressure in fact affected EPA's
conclusions and Congress' exemption of fracing from the Safe
Drinking Water Act can only be surmised, industry had a strong
stake in both the outcome of the report and the legislation, and made
its views on the matter clear.
369. See Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. supra note 153.
370. Judy Pasternak, Bush's Energy Plan Bares Industry Clout, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2001 at A-1 available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/26/news/
mn-38530.
371. Am. Exploration and Prod. Council, supra note 111.
372. IOGCC, Congress Passes IOGCC's Legislative Fix for Hydraulic Fractur-
ing: Historical Overview, COMPACT COMMENTS (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/Websites/iogcc/docs/September 2005.pdf.
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B. Recommendations for Reform
The EPA's and Congress' initial regulatory failures in the area of
fracing suggest that reform is needed to ensure the production and
analysis of better data and the enactment of harm-preventing regula-
tion in the face of incomplete risk information.
1. Generate More Data and Complete a Comprehensive Study of
Fracing and its Effects
Given that oil and gas production companies are injecting hazard-
ous fluids into shale formations and coalbeds at an increasingly rapid
rate without federal oversight and, sometimes, without adequate state
controls, a more comprehensive and scientifically rigorous study of
the effects of fracing is imperative. A federal study will require
close collaboration with states, but combining the states' information
into a larger report is vital. It will provide a broad picture of the ex-
tent of fracing activity throughout the United States, including in-
formation about the regions where it is most prevalent, the differing
environmental concerns in these regions, and the existence of af-
fected resources that cross state boundaries, such as large under-
ground aquifers. A comprehensive study should investigate fracing
not only in coalbeds but also in shales. It should focus particularly
on fracing occurring in regions where the fraced formations are close
to human populations and underground drinking water sources, al-
though it should not ignore the potential for fracing contaminants to
remain in areas that may later experience population growth. Fi-
nally, the study should look beyond direct and indirect injection and
contamination of underground drinking water; the study should in-
vestigate diminution of drinking water supplies caused by the large
quantities of groundwater pumping sometimes required for fracing,
and also consider the effects of surface or underground disposal of
wastewater from fracing.
373
A national, comprehensive, science-based report on fracing is not a
novel concept, and there may be sufficient political will to make it
happen. Senator Jeff Bingaman, former Chairman of the Senate En-
373. Julie Murphy, Coal Bed Methane Wastewater: Establishing a Best Avail-
able Technology Standard for Disposal Under the Clean Water Act, 14 S.E.
ENVTL. L.J. 333, 344 (2006) (arguing that "[w]here chemical solvents are used in
the fracturing process, any introduced contaminants should be removed from the
wastewater prior to disposal").
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ergy Committee, and Senator Inhofe, Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Environment and Public Works, proposed "a full Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. . . study of hydraulic fracturing" in a
provision that passed by 78 to 21, although it ultimately failed be-
cause it was attached to the 107th Congress' energy bill, which never
passed. 7  As Senator Inhofe, one of the bill sponsors, argued,
"well-grounded and academically rigorous science, and not special
interest groups and trial lawyers, should be the foundation for regu-
lation."' 5 While the EPA made a first attempt at the scientific side,
it was incomplete and was less insulated from political forces on
both sides of the issue than an NAS study would be.
In addition to having political support from both sides of the aisle,
a comprehensive scientific study of fracing would benefit many peo-
ple in addition to the government, environmental groups, and con-
cemed citizens. If fracing in many regions is indeed benign, opera-
tors can use the results of the report to persuade citizens that fracing
will not be as invasive as citizens may fear. It will also benefit
states, providing information as they revise regulations, as in Colo-
rado, or as they update their environmental impact assessments, as in
New York. It will produce the "scientific observation of [fracing-]
associated contamination" that the Ground Water Protection Council
argued for in opposing federal regulation ungrounded in science.376
Furthermore, a report that investigates fracing with all types of flu-
ids, in all regions, and in all types of formations, may verify and
provide further support for many state regulators' belief that fracing
in their shales or coalbeds poses few threats that are unaddressed by
current regulation.
2. Re-Consider the Regulation of Fracing under the Safe Drinking
Water Act
Although only a thorough scientific study will determine the
breadth of regulation needed, there are known risks of fracing that
should be addressed immediately. The gravest concern - and one
that is most easily regulated within existing statutory framework - is
groundwater contamination. The EPA report on fracing recognized
that some hazardous fluids are used in fracing, that fluids are often
374. Senator James M. Inhofe & Frank Fannon, Energy and the Env't: The
Future of Natural Gas in Am., 26 ENERGY L.J. 349, 370-71 (2005).
375. Id. at 370.
376. GWPC Survey, supra note 63, at 10.
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injected into formations at high volumes (a maximum average of
150,000 gallons per well, and a minimum average of 57,500 gallons
per well),377 and that not all fluids are removed post-fracing. The
rate at which the fluids are removed from the formation after fracing
varies from 30 to 61 percent in studies summarized by the EPA, al-
though some predict that total recovery could be as high as 68 or 82
378percent. Furthermore, the recovery process lasts 10 to 20
379years, meaning that nearly all of the fluid initially injected may
remain in the ground for years before being even partially recovered.
The EPA report also recognizes that fluids can leak away from the
hydraulically induced fracture "into smaller secondary fractures" and
"become trapped in the secondary fractures and/or pores of porous
rock.'380 "[S]ome fluid constituents may not completely mix with
groundwater," thus preventing their recovery when the producer
pumps groundwater as part of the production process. 381 Of greatest
concern is the EPA's acknowledgement that some chemical con-
stituents in fracing fluids that are not captured in recovery "will
likely be transported by groundwater flowing according to regional
hydraulic gradients, ' '382 and its conclusion, without adequate scien-
tific support, that concentrations of contaminants in the aquifer
would be sufficiently reduced as a result of processes such as ad-
sorption and dilution to avoid substantial human harm.3 83
Because some fracing fluids are injected directly into groundwater
sources and may contaminate those sources, Congress should con-
sider repealing the exemption of fracing from the Safe Drinking Wa-
ter Act. Efforts along these lines have already commenced, although
they may not be ultimately successful. On September 29, 2008,
Representative Diana DeGette of Colorado introduced a bill "[t]o
repeal the exemption for hydraulic fracturing in the Safe Drinking
377. EPA 2004, supra note 7, at 3-11, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw000/ uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach-uic-ch03_cbmpractices.pdf.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 4-16, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOO/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudyattach uic h04_hydfracfluids.pdf.
380. Id. at 3-12, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOO/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudyattach uic ch03_cbmpractices.pdf.
381. Id.at3-13.




3 385Water Act."384  The bill was referred to a House Committee,
however, and does not appear to have made progress. Further con-
gressional attention to this matter is important.
Even if all states had relatively comprehensive protections against
pollution of underground drinking water by fracing, there are valid
arguments for federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Underground sources of drinking water are of national concern, yet
the existing state protections tend to address pollution of local
sources of water, focusing on landowner wells or local lakes,
streams, or aquifers. 386 A contaminant released underground will
not necessarily remain where it is released. Particularly with fracing,
which may induce or lengthen fractures of unanticipated size or con-
nect fractures in one formation to another naturally fractured forma-
tion, the migration of pollutants underground and across state lines is
difficult to predict.38 7 Despite improved technology to better iden-
tify natural fractures and underground formations, the impact of a
pollutant released thousands of feet below ground remains unpre-
dictable, not only for landowners lacking the technology to identify
underground pollutants and bring a nuisance or trespass suit, but also
for scientists who must drill thousands of samples or produce a com-
plex model that determines the pollutant's location and migration. 388
Furthermore, even in an area that is currently sparsely populated, a
fracing fluid that enters a formation or an underground drinking wa-
384. H.R. 7231, 1 10th Cong. 2d Session (Sept. 29, 2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_congbis&doc
id=f:h723 I ih.txt.pdf.
385. Thomas, the Library of Congress, H.R. 7231, Bill Status, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dl 10:26:./temp/-bdo2Di:@@@X.
386. See, e.g., supra note 281 (discussing Pennsylvania regulations requiring
drillers to describe "streams, wetlands, and other bodies of water" near the pro-
posed drilling site); supra note 251, and accompanying text (requiring the driller to
describe whether the site is "over a primary or principal aquifer; whether it is
within a certain distance of a public water supply well, surface municipal water
supply, or "lake, stream, or other public surface water body").
387. See, e.g., Lawrence Ng, A Drastic Approach to Controlling Groundwater
Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 773, 776 (1989) (arguing that "[d]ue to significant limita-
tions in the mapping and monitoring of acquifers [sic], it is difficult to determine
accurately the full extent of groundwater contamination" and that "[o]nce con-
taminants enter an aquifer it is hard to predict precisely how those contaminants
will be dispersed throughout the body of groundwater").
388. State Oil and Gas Board Administrative Code, § 400-4-2-01(3)(b), avail-
able at http://www.gsa.state.al.us/ogb/rules.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
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ter source may remain there for decades, 389 posing problems for fu-
ture inhabitants. The Safe Drinking Water Act was designed to pro-
tect against these very types of concerns: originally aimed at prob-
lems arising from state regulations of varying effectiveness, 390 the
Act attempted to unify drinking water regulation to ensure that all
communities were protected against contamination of their drinking
water sources. 39 1 And the Underground Injection Control program
in particular was a direct response to the dearth of federal limitations
on ground water pollution, as Congress worried that underground
water sources were not adequately protected.392
Certain federal regulations already apply to fracing, highlighting
the need for federal regulation of activities with effects beyond the
jurisdiction of individual states. In Pennsylvania, for example, op-
erators disposing of certain hazardous fluids on the surface must first
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
393
under the federal Clean Water Act. New York also alerts drillers to
the possibility that there may be threatened or endangered species on
the fracing site, raising the possibility of Endangered Species Act
restrictions.394
Various industry members, and even the Department of Energy,
have vehemently argued against federal regulation of fracing, urging
389. See, e.g., Ng, supra note 387, at 778 (discussing how "[o]nce an aquifer is
polluted.., it may remain polluted indefinitely").
390. William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for
Effective Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL'Y REV. 69, 75 (2006) (discussing how prior to the
enactment of the Safe Drinking Water Act, "[c]oncern about pesticides and a wide
range of chemicals with unknown long-range effects, together with lingering epi-
sodes of waterborne disease, caused doubt concerning the adequacy of drinking
water management programs").
391. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 6454 (1974) ("The purpose of the legisla-
tion is to assure that water supply systems serving the public meet minimum na-
tional standards for protection of public health.").
392. Cox, supra note 390, at 79; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, supra note
294 (expressing concern that "it appears that the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act may not authorize any regulation of deep well injection of wastes which is not
carried out in conjunction with a discharge into navigable waters" and that "the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act's restrictive definition of pollutant may pre-
vent any Federal control system from adequately protecting underground drinking
water sources").
393. See Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., supra note 282.




that state regulation is adequate 395 and that federal intervention will
add another confusing and costly regulatory layer to the process.
396
Drilling companies' objections to more regulation, whether at the
federal or state level, are understandable. The oil and gas industry is
already heavily regulated,397 and national companies wrestle with
numerous state regulations, many of which are inconsistent. But
federal regulation of fracing under the Safe Drinking Water Act
should pose few problems for industry if fracing indeed poses low
risks to underground drinking water: the Underground Injection
Control regulations only require states to "prevent underground in-
jection which endangers drinking water sources. 398  Although the
permit applicant must "satisfy the State" that its injection will not
endanger these sources, 399 this process will not be overly burden-
some for permit applicants who plan to frac using relatively benign
fluids or in formations isolated from drinking water sources.
3. Evaluate State Fracing Policy and Regulations
In addition to Congress' seriously considering the re-inclusion of
fracing within the Safe Drinking Water Act, more is needed at the
state level to address environmental effects that extend far beyond
injection - regardless of whether federal regulation occurs. States
should use the information from a comprehensive scientific study to
revisit and potentially update their regulations and best management
practices. 4°° In states like Montana, where most fracing is occurring
395. See, e.g., American Petroleum Institute, supra note 128 (arguing that the
"current balanced management approach serves the nation well.... [T]he current
approach retains the effective state regulatory programs that protect the environ-
ment"); Nat'l Energy Technology Laboratory, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Policy Facts:
More Restrictive Regulation (Hydraulic Fracturing) Could Impact Natural Gas
Supply, available at http://www.neti.doe.gov/publications/factsheets/policy/Pol-
icy001.pdf ("More restrictive regulation of hydraulic fracturing, which may not
increase the protection of underground drinking water, could have a deleterious
effect on the supply of natural gas in the U.S.. .
396. See, e.g., supra note 157.
397. See, e.g., Angela Neese, Comment: The Battle Between the Colo. Oil and
Gas Conservation Comm 'n and Local Gov'ts: A Call for a New and Comprehen-
sive Approach, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 561, 574 (2005) (describing "Colorado's oil
and gas industry" as "one of the most heavily regulated in the United States").
398. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1).
399. Ibid.
400. Some oil and gas associations agree with this approach, although they do
not argue for federal involvement. The Division of Professional Affairs of the
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far from concentrated human populations and in formations that are
generally isolated from drinking water sources, and in states like
New York, where the fracing occurs "thousands of feet below drink-
ing water sources," state regulators tend to believe that general regu-
lation through the permitting process is adequate. 401 A national
study would, however, allow these states to consider a range of po-
tential environmental impacts beyond groundwater-related concerns
and to identify whether or not further regulation is necessary.
Some states, like Colorado and Pennsylvania,40 2 have already be-
gun or completed this process. This "re-visitation" of regulation
should focus on methods for reducing the amount of water required
for a fracing operation, surface impacts of the fracing operation on
local plant and animal species, the use of non-toxic fracing agents,
better methods for removing more of the excess sand and proppants
from the formation, and on ways to reduce wastewater from the frac-
ing operation and to filter the wastewater before disposing of it.
States that determine that fracing is insufficiently regulated have
good examples to build from, such as Pennsylvania's oil and gas
management practices and Marcellus Shale permit requirements,
which cover everything from the surface impact of roads leading to
fracing operations to concerns over plant and animal biodiversity on
the drilling site, the amount of drawdown from local groundwater
sources, use of public water supplies, and disposal methods for
wastewater. States should consider all of these "cradle to grave"
effects when regulating and should also provide specific opportuni-
ties for citizen input; citizens near fracing operations may be the best
watchdogs for state regulators who do not have the time and re-
sources to monitor each and every fracing operation.
Furthermore, states that have not yet done so should ban the use of
fracing fluids for which there is national consensus of a danger of
American Association of Petroleum Geologists, for example, argues that
"[s]cientifically designed, state-based environmental oversight of hydraulic frac-
turing treatments for those coalbed methane and other hydrocarbon wells that may
occur near zones of potable water is a reasonable approach." Division of Profes-
sional Affairs, American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Position Statement:
Hydraulic Fracturing, available at http://dpa.aapg.org/gac/statements/ hydrau-
licfracturing.pdf.
401. See, Richmond, supra note 130.




contamination. Diesel fuel should be the first regulatory foCUS. 4 0 3
Although the EPA in 2003 "entered into a Memorandum of Agree-
ment ... with three major service companies to voluntarily eliminate
diesel fuel from hydraulic fracturing fluids that are injected di-
rectly" 404 into underground sources of drinking water during coalbed
methane development, and industry representatives at the time "es-
timated that these three companies perform approximately 95 per-
cent of the hydraulic fracturing projects in the United States,,,405 the
agreement is not enforceable, as it provides that "[a]ny Company or
EPA may terminate its participation in this . . . [memorandum of
agreement] by providing written notice to the other signatories ...
Such termination as to that Company ... will be effective 30 days
after the receipt of written notice and will result in no penalties or
continuing obligations by the terminating companies. Nor is
there any guarantee that the three companies that signed the Agree-
ment - BJ Services Company, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and
Schlumberger Technology Corporation - will continue to maintain
this large percentage of production. The EPA report also fails to
explain where the five percent of injection with diesel fuel identified
in 2004 might still be occurring. If operators are still fracing with
diesel fuel near water sources serving substantial populations or in
particularly sensitive areas, the memorandum of agreement is not
enough. Nor does the EPA's report discuss whether the service
companies who have voluntarily agreed to stop using diesel fuel in
fracing have in fact stopped; there is no discussion of monitoring.
There is some federal protection against diesel fuel contamination
of groundwater caused by fracing, as the Safe Drinking Water Act,
even after revision in 2005, includes diesel fuel used in fracing in the
definition of underground injection, thus requiring states to control
its use in their underground injection programs. 40 Under the EPA
regulations enacted under the Act, states must have regulations at
least as stringent as the federal regulations in order to have primary
403. See, Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 114; EPA 2004, supra
note 7; Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 116.
404. EPA 2004, Executive Summary, supra note 7, at ES-2, available at
http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach-uic-execsumm.pdf.
405. Id.
406. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 13, at 5.
407. H.R. 6, § 322, 109 t" Cong, (1st Sess. 2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h 109-6.
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enforcement authority over underground injection activities, 4°8 and
the federal regulations provide that "[n]o owner or operator shall
construct, operate, maintain, convert, plug, abandon, or conduct any
other injection activity in a manner that allows the movement of
fluid containing any contaminant into underground sources of drink-
ing water" if the contaminant would violate relevant drinking water
regulations. 40 9  But an underground injection program does not
cover the other potential problems with diesel fuel, such as surface
contamination from the disposal of fracing fluids. Given the consen-
sus over the risks of diesel fuel in fracing, a ban on this practice by
states would provide a better guarantee against all types of environ-
mental contamination than does a memorandum of agreement signed
by the oil and gas industry and the EPA in 2003 or states' under-
ground injection control regulation.
States should also consider banning or tightly controlling other
fracing fluids that have already been identified as risky. 410  EPA
concluded in 2004, for example, that
[a]ccording to information gathered from . . . [material
safety data sheets], on-site reconnaissance of fracturing
jobs, and interviews with service company employees,
some hydraulic fracturing fluids may contain constituents
of potential concern . . . . Constituents of potential con-
cern include ... bactericides, acids, diesel fuel, solvents,
and/or alcohols. Although the largest portion of fractur-
ing fluid constituents is nontoxic (>95% by volume), di-
rect fluid injection into . . . [underground sources of
drinking water] of some potentially toxic chemicals does
take place.41'
408. 40 C.F.R. § 145.1 (1994) (explaining how implemented provisions of a
state underground injection control program must "establish requirements at least
as stringent as the corresponding... provisions" in the EPA regulations).
409. 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a) (1987), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/
cfr_2002/julqtr/pdf/40cfr144.12.pdf.
410. See, e.g., Mary Griffiths, Coalbed Methane Development in Alberta: An
Environmental Perspective, 2008 PRoc. FiFTH ANN. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS AND
COALBED METHANE CoNF. 7 (listing as a "best practice" the avoidance of "hydro-
carbon or other toxic additives, where fracturing in or near [a] non-saline zone").




In identifying and considering control options for harmful fracing
fluids, states should investigate whether any new toxic agents have
been introduced as fracing fluid constituents since EPA's study, as
fracing activity has increased substantially since the study was com-
pleted.412
4. Highlight and Encourage Successful Private Efforts of
Companies
The importance of the private sector in reducing the environmental
effects of fracing also cannot be overemphasized. As the technology
and techniques of fracing have advanced, so has the technology for
reducing the contamination and waste generated by fracing. Col-
laboration between GE and a corporation in Midland, Texas, 413 for
example, has resulted in a water distillation process that reclaims
nearly 70% of the wastewater from oil and gas fracing operations.
414
This could greatly improve fracing operations in states like Texas,
where GE estimates that there are more than 50,000 permitted dis-
415posal wells for wastewater. GE plans to first make this process
available to the "Barnett, Fayetteville and Appalachian Shale natural
gas drilling" operations, "locations notorious for difficult-to-treat
wastewater. ',416 Private companies, as demonstrated by the EPA's
report, have also responded to landowner concerns by purchasing
property polluted by methane after coalbed fracturing or providing
replacement water when fracturing or related operations polluted
nearby wells, although some landowners complained that supplies
were not adequate. In Pennsylvania, companies are required to re-
store or replace landowner water supplies polluted by fracing or re-
lated activities if the Department of Environmental Protection finds
that there is a causal connection between the operation and pollu-
412. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 12, at 4 (observing that "only in the last few
years has the industry begun the injection of fluids to conduct hydraulic fracturing
in aquifers that supply, or could supply, community and individually-owned drink-
ing wells").
413. See STW Resources, Inc., Executive Summary, available at
http://www.stwresources.com/about.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
414. See id.
415. Id.
416. Society of Petroleum Engineers, New Collaboration Aims to Recover Hy-
draulic Fracturing Wastewater, J. PETROLEUM TECH. (2008), available at
http://updates.spe.org/index.php/2008/08/18/new-collaboration-aims-to-recover-
hydraulic-fracturing-wastewater/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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tion,417 but some regions have no formal landowner compensation
programs.4 18 States should consider implementing compensation or
mitigation requirements similar to Pennsylvania's, 419 for situations
where landowners' water or land has been harmed by fracing, and in
the meantime, companies should diligently address valid landowner
concerns and, ideally, prevent pollution before it occurs.
Some oil and gas companies are already taking the initiative to
work with communities and listen to their concerns about environ-
mental effects: one production company at an unconventional gas
production conference in Canada communicated the importance of,
"[a]t an early stage," giving the community "project-specific infor-
mation, offering the "opportunity to voice concerns," and "under-
stand[ing] community values/vision.",420 In conducting a drilling
project, the company "[i]nitiated [a] broad environmental and heri-
tage resource assessment" and evaluated the "potential footprint" of
production, while holding periodic open houses and fostering com-
munications with the community along the way.
421
A national report will support these types of private efforts, allow-
ing production companies to identify the areas of high risk of pollu-
tion or groundwater depletion from fracing and to implement strate-
gies to avoid these risks. It could also identify projects where im-
pacts were reduced as a result of production companies working with
communities or implementing pollution prevention and water saving
strategies for their fracing operations. Such efforts should be high-
lighted and further encouraged by regulators and industry leaders.
417. See, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.201(a)(2)(b) (West 2008).
418. See, e.g., Larry Charach, Executive Director, Gas Markets and Utilities
Business Unit, Alberta Department of Energy, NGC Consultation Process and
Observations, in 2003 PRoC. FIFTH ANN. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS & COAL BED
METHANE CONF. 8 (explaining that there is "no formal established compensation
to land owners" in Wyoming's coal basins).
419. See supra notes 271-273 and accompanying text.
420. K. Heffernan, Trident Exploration Corp., Remarks at the Unconventional
Coal Bed Methane Conf.: Living the Philosophy - Community and Environment
Practices at the Fort Assiniboine Joint Venture, 2003 PRoc. FIFTH ANN.
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS & COALBED METHANE CONF. 7.




Although fracing has existed for more than half a century, it has
only recently boomed as a result of rising energy prices and declin-
ing production from conventional sources. With this boom, opera-
tors around the country are injecting an array of fluids into an array
of formations. Some of the techniques pose grave concerns, particu-
larly those in shallow coalbeds over drinking water sources, while
others are purportedly benign. But no one knows the full range of
effects because they have not been adequately researched. The
EPA's report is the most comprehensive to date, but was part of a
highly-charged political process and was never completed, because
the EPA concluded, perhaps prematurely, that further study was un-
necessary. Furthermore, the report investigated fracing in only one
type of formation - coalbeds - and assessed the impacts of one stage
of fracing, failing to seriously consider concerns such as groundwa-
ter depletion and surface disposal of fracing waste. The highest
regulatory priority for fracing should be the instigation of a federal,
scientifically rigorous report prepared by the National Academy of
Sciences or a similar "neutral" body and a simultaneous regulatory
risk-limiting mechanism.
Next, based on the data contained within this report, and given the
risks of certain types of fracing, Congress should consider reversing
its 2005 exemption of fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act; it
should not wait to commence this process pending the completion of
the report, although the report will be essential for future statutory
and regulatory decisions. Whatever the technical distinctions of the
definition of "injection," fracing sometimes involves the pumping of
toxic fluids into formations that are part of an underground source of
drinking water or close to a water source, and it may present serious
concerns for the quality of intra- and inter-state sources of water.
The Safe Drinking Water Act was meant to address these very types
of concerns, stating in the 1996 Amendments that "safe drinking
water is essential to the protection of human health., 422 The Safe
Drinking Water Act is also premised on the idea that a "sound scien-
tific basis" should inform all regulations423 - suggesting that a com-
prehensive report on the effects of fracing is in order. It also rests on
422. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-182 § 3(1),
110 Stat 1613, 1614.
423. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-182 § 3(5),
110 Stat 1613, 1615.
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the priority that "states play a central role in the implementation of
safe drinking water programs" and need "appropriate flexibility to
ensure the prompt and effective development and implementation of
drinking water programs." 424 Federal regulation of fracing with re-
spect to the injection of fluids into or near underground sources of
drinking water need not be viewed primarily as an additional costly
layer; in another light, it is a part of the already-existing amalgama-
tion of regulations that govern fracing - whether those are controls
on surface disposal of fracing wastes and similar drilling wastes un-
der the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Act, as referenced
in the Pennsylvania regulations, or controls on the quantity of water
used for fracing under Texas state water law. And while a federal
statute certainly adds a layer to this existing amalgamation and is
burdensome in some respects, 425 it is an important layer in regions
where fracing may cause environmental and human health concerns.
Finally, states should use the report to re-visit and update their oil
and gas regulations and to ensure that the regulations adequately
cover the impacts of fracing. Specifically, they should ensure that
landowners bordering a frac site receive prior notice and an opportu-
nity to voice concerns and that regulations address fracing from cra-
dle to grave, including the type of fluid used; the location, extent,
and spacing of fracing; the quantity and source of water used; and
disposal methods. Much of this regulation can, and already is, oc-
curring through the general state permitting process, where operators
are traditionally required to describe on an application the location
and techniques of drilling as well as disposal methods for wastes.
The extent to which potential federal regulation and revised state
regulation of fracing will in fact be burdensome and costly remains
to be seen. A scientific report will inform the need for regulation and
in many regions may bolster the claims that fracing does not require
more regulation than already exists. But for the known risks, and the
risks that emerge from a comprehensive report, regulators must not
turn a blind eye. In the rush to extract essential resources, a process
which itself contributes to human wellbeing, other aspects of human
424. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-182 § 3(4),
110 Stat 1613, 1615.
425. See, e.g., American Exploration and Production Council, supra note 104
(stating that "many attorneys believe that ... cases [similar to LEAF] would pro-
duce similar results - a forced federal regulation in each state" and that the "issue
presents the worst of the governance process").
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wellbeing - the quality of the environment and public health - must
not be cast aside as a mere impediment to progress.

